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the day to day lives Vietnamese workers, I will argue that ideologically freighted 
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1  INTRODUCTION: EXPOITATION OR SOCIALIST FRATERNITY? 
On April 11, 1980, the German Democratic Republic signed a bi-lateral labor agreement 
with the lately minted Socialist Republic of Vietnam that would, by 1989, bring roughly 60,000 
Vietnamese Vetrasarbeiter (contract workers) to live and work in the GDR.
1
  While the image of 
Vietnamese men and women working side by side with native East Germans may seem at first 
anomalous, the fact is that from the early years of its history, the GDR had entered into what the 
its Politburo (The German Socialist Unity Party, or SED) professed to be “fraternal partnerships” 
with not only the Soviet satellite states of the Eastern Bloc, but with fledgling socialist nations 
emerging in the post 1945 wake of decolonization in Africa and Asia. Initially, this project of 
“partnership” could be taken more or less at face value: the GDR, styling itself as the model of a 
socialist state accomplished, extended material and martial aid to countries that still struggled to 
throw off the Western imperialist yoke. Along these lines, East Germany officially entered into 
diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam in 1949; and throughout the 
course of the Vietnam War, the GDR provided crucial economic and military aid to the North 
Vietnamese in the name of socialist unity and resistance to American imperial aggression.
2
 In 
addition to directly supporting the war effort, the GDR also invited thousands of young 
Vietnamese men and women to receive education and training in East German universities and 
technical schools. Prior to 1980, the GDR’s relationship with Vietnam (and to varying degrees 
other state socialisms) was one that did in fact evince a more genuine—if paternalistic—altruism 
                                                          
1
 Although the exact numbers are uncertain—as SED, VEB and MfSS documents, while having preserved running 
regional totals of Vietnamese in the GDR, did not, with the Wall’s collapse, offer final tabulations—present 
literature estimates that between 1980 and 1989, over 70,000 Vietnamese men and women came to work in the 
GDR, with between 59,000 and 60,000 living in East Germany at the time of reunification. See Eva Kolinsky,  
“Former Contract Workers from Vietnam in Eastern Germany:  Between State Socialism and  Democracy 1989-
1993,” gfl-journal  3 (2004): 84; and Mike Dennis “Working Under Hammer and Sickle: Vietnamese Workers in the 
German Democratic Republic, 1980-1989,” German Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September, 2007): 339-340. 
2
 Dennis, “Working under Hammer and Sickle,” 341. 
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in furtherance of its ideological mission.  The bi-lateral agreement signed with the SVR 
government in 1980, however, substantively changed the GDR’s relationship with its 
“Vietnamese brothers.”3 
This thesis engages precisely the shift from the GDR’s more ideologically consonant 
practice of aiding other socialist countries in need, to the more self-serving and economically 
exploitative relationship it embarked on with the SRV in the 1980s. This notion of “shift” is an 
important one to consider if scholarship is to engage the GDR in an even-handed and 
intellectually honest way. To purge historical inquiry of the lingering bias of the Cold War 
Western conception that all socialisms are inherently corrupt and inexorably doomed (minus, of 
course, the more or less successful social democracies in Scandinavia) it is necessary to first 
grant a state like the GDR potential for contingency, to allow that it changed over time and, in 
fact, had a history—and one that was not pre-ordained by the social-scientific models of either 
Marxism/Leninism or neoliberal capitalism.  If the GDR pursued a program of internationalist 
economic cooperation, it did so at least to some degree directed by Lenin’s ideologeme that 
socialism itself must be understood within a context of ethno-national hierarchy. If socialism in 
its most accomplished state eschewed nationalist identity in favor of international proletariat 
unity, it followed by (vulgar) Marxism’s developmental, quasi-constructivist historical logic that 
some societies on the teleological continuum would need to pass through stages of ethnic and 
nationalist self-identification before reaching the culminant state  of socialism.
4
 As this socio-
                                                          
3
 The language employed by the SED (Socialist Unity Party) when addressing the Vietnamese state and its people 
without fail employed explicitly fraternal terms. The title of a 1978 article in the East German daily Neues 
Deutschland, “Mit der SRV brüderlich verbunden” (With Vietnam we are bound as brothers) typifies this rhetorical 
strategy.  
4
 On the question of nationalism’s role in social democracy’s developmental paradigm, Lenin wrote: “The 
categorical requirement of Marxist theory in investigating any social question is that it be examined 
within definite historical limits, and, if it refers to a particular country (e. g., the national programme [sic] for a given 
country), that account be taken of the specific features distinguishing that country from others in the same historical 
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historical model was taken as orthodox by the East German government, then it was the GDR’s 
historical mission to aid the development and defense of other state socialisms around the world; 
and its relationship with Vietnam was always conceptualized within these ideological 
parameters.  
Leaving aside for the moment the inherent paternalism of this thinking, what demands 
investigation is the transition from a more genuine program of socialist cooperation to the GDR’s 
reliance on foreign labor explicitly to meet economic demands. And, of course, this transition 
does not represent an absolutely clean break. As Damien Mac Con Uldah has noted, the GDR’s 
training and education initiatives for foreign students prior to 1980 were themselves driven by 
more than ideological consistency. 
5
 Early in the GDR’s history, the SED was desperate for some 
measure of international legitimacy. In the shadow of the Soviet Union, East Germany’s status as 
an autarkic and distinct “German nation” was at once a real desideratum for party heads and a 
profound site of historical and political anxiety.  The argument that the Soviet Zone of 
occupation in Eastern Germany—and the establishment of a communist state within historical 
German borders—was merely a reversal of traditional colonial trajectories beleaguered national 
self-conception in the GDR at least until the General Treaty with FRG in 1972.
6
 Strict 
consonance with socialist ideology was one strategy by which the SED could establish not only 
its own legitimacy, but the legitimacy of the state it ruled. The diplomatic ties that the GDR 
established with North Vietnam in 1949 were to some extent an effort to credential itself on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
epoch.” See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in Lenin’s Collected Works, Vol. 
20, translated by Bernard Isaacs and Joe Fineberg (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 400. Accessed February 20, 
2021 at http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm. 
5
 See Damian Henry Ton Mac Con Uladh, “Guests of the Socialist Nation? Foreign Students and Workers in the 
GDR, 1949-1990 (Ph. D. diss., University College London, 2005), 42. 
6
 See Mike Dennis, The Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1990 (Essex: Pearson LTD., 
2000), 3-23 and 51-78. 
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international stage. As Mike Dennis notes, in the early post war years both states were 
“diplomatic pariahs”— the GDR in large part due to the stance of the U.S. allied Federal 
Republic to its West—so a diplomatic linkage fostered by GDR support for Vietnam against 
American imperialism made political sense.
7
 However, beyond these larger geo-political and 
ideological justifications, the GDR also reaped economic benefit from its relationship with 
Vietnam prior to 1980. 
8
 
Beginning in the 1960s, students came from fledgling socialist states like Algeria, Korea 
and North Vietnam to study in the GDR largely to solidify newly forged diplomatic ties. As the 
GDR extended scholarships to all students visiting as part of the state’s training and education 
initiatives, such diplomacy became an increasing financial burden. In the early 1960s, it was 
estimated by the State Secretariat for Higher and Vocational Education that the cost per annum 
for hosting international students was over 22 million marks. The justification for this 
expenditure, though not one that would have been readily admitted to by the SED, was that 
training young men and women from other socialist states would ultimately translate into 
increased exports for the GDR, effectively creating “the German economy’s customers of 
tomorrow.”9 The creation of a “customer base” being the final goal of the training programs, the 
SED soon determined that training international students in technical institutions rather than 
universities would ultimately be of more use to the East German state (presumably because 
qualification in skilled trades would lead to bolstered industrial infrastructure in other socialist 
                                                          
7
 Mike Dennis, “Working under Hammer and Sickle,” 341. 
8
 Ibid., 341. 
9
 Damian Henry Tone Mac Con Uladh, “Guests of the Socialist Nation,” 42-43. 
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economies, hence creating a greater demand for East German products and raw materials 
abroad).
10
 
With the signing of the bi-lateral labor agreement with the SRV in 1980, however, the 
GDR entered into a relationship that although still couched in the high-born language of socialist 
fraternity, was almost entirely driven by economic necessity. By the early 1980s, economic 
output in the GDR was at withered variance with the booming consumer economy in the Federal 
Republic.  The Honecker regime’s policy of intensified rationalization—at the expense of 
economic flexibility and technological development—had left the GDR economically moribund: 
“the Soviet-style road to modernity was becoming littered with the wreckage of obsolescent 
machines in the GDR of the Honecker era, innovative ideas were stifled by the obligatory 
fulfillment of planning targets, in particular the quantity of production.”11  Moreover, the 
problem of unrealistic production quotas was exacerbated by an increasingly overburdened and 
mismanaged East German work force.
12
 Added to these problems were the lingering effects of 
the world energy crisis (which had driven up the price of oil and gas from the Soviet Union, the 
GDR’s main supplier), and vast debt that East Germany had incurred to the FRG after the 
General Treaty of 1972 had freed up the possibility of obtaining credit in the West.
13
 
There is a general consensus among GDR historians that the 1980 labor agreement with 
Vietnam was not entered into on the grounds of fostering “socialist brotherhood.”14  What has 
                                                          
10
 For a general discussion of the strategy behind the GDR’s international technical training initiatives, see Damian 
Henry Tone Mac Con Uladh, “Guests of the Socialist Nation,” 43-44. 
11
 Mike Dennis, Social and Economic Modernization in Eastern Germany from Honecker to Kohl (London: Pinter 
Publishers Ltd., 1993), 4-5. 
12
 Ibid., 33. 
13
 For a thorough and largely unbiased assessment of the GDR economy, see Thomas A. Baylis, “Explaining the 
GDR’s Economic Strategy,” International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Spring, 1986): 381-420. 
14
 That is to say, there is consensus among the historians that have considered the inter-governmental agreements. 
Although there are several German scholars who have engaged the topic of Vietnamese labor in the GDR, most have 
only considered the phenomenon in the post Wende context. For general discussions of the Vietnamese labor 
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not been investigated, however, is the extent to which the SED’s refusal to publicly acknowledge 
economic circumstances that made the Vietnamese Vertragsarbeiter a necessity not only 
prohibited the integration of foreign workers into the East German population, but also served to 
undermine the government’s legitimacy.   Continuing to portray the GDR’S relationship with 
Vietnam as a deepening of fraternal cooperation was nothing more than a political expedient by 
the early 1980s. Rather than make public the chronic labor shortages, supply problems, gaining 
debt, and general inefficiency of the command economy, the SED never officially communicated 
to the East Germans that Vietnamese men and women were in fact working in the GDR in an 
effort prevent the collapse of the state.
15
 
This tactic of concealing the true objective of the labor agreement with Vietnam behind a 
veil of internationalist rhetoric was lent apparent credibility by the GRD’s history of extending 
educational and technical training opportunities to foreign cohorts.
16
  As Dennis Kuck claimed in 
a 2001 article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, prior to the 1980, Vietnamese workers who 
came to the East Germany were represented by official propaganda as partners in “‘work force 
cooperation’ within the framework of ‘socialist economic integration’…[and] as long as the 
GDR was economically superior to other socialist states, workers could come from those states 
to ‘build socialism in their homeland.’”17  But, Kuck continues, with the 1980 agreement, “the 
GDR clearly stipulated that labor was of higher priority than professional training.”18  Kuck’s 
statement is, however, misleading.  While with the benefit of hindsight the 1980 labor contract 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
programs in English, see Mike Dennis, “Working Under Hammer and Sickle,” Eva Kolinsky, “Former Contract 
Workers  from Vietnam in Eastern Germany,” and Damian Henry Tone Mac Con Uladh, “Guests of the Socialist 
Nation.” 
15
 Dennis, “Working under Hammer and Sickle,” 341-342. 
16
 Dennis, “Working under Hammer and Sickle,” 340. 
17
 Dennis Kuck, “Die fremden sozialistischen Brüder,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 October 2001, reprinted 
in Göktürk, Gramling and Kaes, eds., Germany in Transit, 98 
18
 Ibid., 99. 
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could be viewed, in and of itself, as the SED’s tacit acknowledgement of the GDR’s economic 
decline, the fact remains that economic necessity was never presented to the East German public 
as an explanation for the post-1980 influx of Vietnamese workers.  The rhetorical figure of 
socialist solidarity invariably served as the East German government’s justification of immigrant 
populations—Vietnamese or otherwise—living within GDR borders.  And this strategy of 
obfuscation, according to Damien Mac Con Uladh, can be traced back well before the 1980 labor 
agreement. It is his claim that the SED’s representation of foreign labor programs as “training for 
socialist economic integrations” was a “semantic ploy to disguise the real economic nature of the 
agreements.
19
 
What follows further investigates this semantic ploy.  Uldah, Dennis and Kuck all agree 
that the SED’s  economic agenda contradicted its outward justification for international labor 
agreements; but what they do not fully engage are the social and ideological ramifications of this 
contradiction for Vietnamese workers and native East German’s alike.  To begin with, the 
distinction between the West German Gastearbeiter (guest worker) and the East German 
Vertragsarbeiter (contract worker) was ideologically critical for the SED.  Beginning in earnest 
in the 1960s the Federal Republic began to draw its Gastarbeiter from Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Yugoslavia and, most prominently, Turkey.  As Rita Chin avers, this program was styled in the 
West German press as tremendously beneficial arrangement for both the FDR and its client 
nations, as “government leaders would maintain national prosperity, business leaders would 
obtain much-needed manpower, and guest workers would gain access to a higher standard of 
                                                          
19
 Damian Henry Tone Mac Con Uladh, “Guests of the Socialist Nation,” 66. 
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living.”20 The SED’s platform on internationalist solidarity, however, demanded that the East’s 
“socialist friends” be distinguished from capitalist West Germany’s foreign laborers. 
This distinction, however, only bore itself out on the level of ideology (especially as 
systemic economic failure became increasing difficult to hide).  The type of employment that the 
Vietnamese found themselves in upon reaching the GDR speaks to this assertion, as they were 
not “trained” in skilled manufacturing positions consonant with the utopian socialist ideal, but 
rather, in most cases, labored in undesirable, low-skilled positions, “i.e. the kind that Germans 
did not what to take on.”21  Beyond this, the sheer number of Vietnamese brought to work in East 
Germany over the course of the 1980s indicates a practical necessity that far exceeded the 
mission of solidarity: by 1987, the number of Vietnamese living and working in the GDR 
approached 30 thousand; by the time of the Wende, that number had more than doubled.  The 
question that follows here is if the GDR’s economic need for foreign labor cohorts was so great, 
why did the SED find it necessary to represent its agreement with Vietnam only in terms of 
“internationalist cooperation”?  Was it simply a matter of a repressive, totalitarian regime 
pursuing a policy of obfuscation and misinformation in order keep its population under its 
thumb?  Or was a measure of dissociation, an intractable fissure between the facts of “real 
existing socialism” and the pervasive, propagandistic rhetoric of ideology, in some way 
fundamentally constitutive of the discourses of East German socialism itself? As the extant 
literature concerning the lives of Vietnamese workers in East Germany says little on this point, it 
is necessary to look to the broader historiography of the GDR to provide answers.                                                                                                                              
                                                          
20
 Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5. 
21
 Eva Kolinsky, “Between State Socialism and Democracy, 1989-1993: Former Contract Workers from Vietnam in 
Eastern Germany.” gfl-Journal, No. 3 (2004): 87.  
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1.1  Historiography of the GDR: Hewing the Middle Path 
The German Democratic Republic has been, at least for most of the Western capitalist 
world, consigned to the dustbin of modern history. The irony that this very phase was wielded (if 
not minted) by Trosky as he baited his Menshivik foes at the Second Party Congress is, in point 
of fact, instrumental to the work at hand. The GDR itself was replete with irony: a “democratic 
republic” without enfranchisement; a socialist utopia where class was abolished, the proletariat 
lionized, and yet a network of secret police and denunciation of one’s neighbors were deemed 
necessary to perpetuate arcadia; a partition of the German nation built on self-proclaimed iron-
clad anti-fascist credentials; men and women who were the putatively incontestable post 1945 
legacy of upright German Communism, but were in fact often late converts from a now 
anathema National Socialist ideology
22—all this would seem to indicate that the GDR, its 
citizens, its regnant (though never by popular mandate) political body, the SED, its culture and 
politics writ large, comprised what amounts to nothing more than a history of blind and despotic 
sanctimony. At least this is how the history of the GDR has been primarily represented by 
scholarship in the liberal and neoliberal West.  
It is of course no surprise that Western academia—not to mention Western journalism—had 
among its ranks its fair share of Cold Warriors prior to the Wende; and it is also does not shock 
that the discursive and ideologically delimited territory in which mainstream Western European 
and American scholars conceptualized the “Soviet menace” and its minion states would not 
permit the trespass of ideas that would valorize any aspect Communist life, political or 
otherwise. They general tenor of scholarship produced on the GDR prior to 1990 assumed as 
                                                          
22
 For a discussion of the generation overlap between the cohort of Hitler Youth and the early SED functionaries, see 
Mary Fullbrook, “Changing States, Changing Selves: Generations in the Third Reich and the GDR,” in Un-civlizing 
Processes? Excess and Transgression in German Society and Culture: Perspectives Debating with Norbert Elisas, 
ed. Mary Fullbrook (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi B.V., 2007), 255-294. 
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virtual warrant the inefficiency and endemic social and political mismanagement of socialist 
states. For example, a typical assessment of the GDR in the late 1980s claimed a kind of willful 
irrationality—one holding much in common with German romanticism of the 18th and 19th 
centuries—that privileged the collective over the individual was an originary defect of 
Marxist/Leninist thought, and that such a rejection of the basic tenants of “human nature” (that is 
to say, the “truth” of self empowering free liberal markets) could not fail to produce perverse if 
not disastrous results.
23
 Of course a second irony rears its head here: even if the GDR persisted in 
a glaring schism between its ideology and its practice, writing on GDR that criticizes the 
contradictions of, say, historical materialism is generally blinkered by an ideology equally 
strident—the “free” capitalist market as a singular and deductive good.  
But, ideology aside, it is also necessary to understand that prior to the breach of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, historiography of the GDR emanating from the West had very little to go on 
beyond cold war platitudes.  In the last two decades, however, this situation has changed 
dramatically. From a research perspective, the gates to the relic kingdom have been thrown open; 
since the early 1990s with the new availability of East German State archives, scholarly articles 
and monographs concerning the culture, society, economy and finally fate of the GDR number in 
the hundreds and counting. Generally speaking, these works can be divided into two antipodal 
camps: the first continues to treat the GDR as decidedly totalitarian (an admittedly problematic 
classification)
24
, oppressive in conception and execution, a quasi-colonized puppet of the Soviet 
Union with a government wholly illegitimate and illiberal, and a population either numbed into a 
welfare-state-induced torpor or inchoately and perpetually disaffected; the second approach takes 
                                                          
23
 See Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Easter Europe: The Poverty of Utopia (London/New 
York; Routledge, 1988), 3-5. 
24
 For a discussion of the misapplication of “totalitarianism” to the GDR, see Jürgen Kocka, “The GDR: A Special 
Kind of Modern Dictatorship,” n Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. 
Konrad H. Jaraush (New York: Berhahn Books, 1999), 17-26. 
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a more sympathetic view of the GDR, validating its history as a noble but tragically flawed 
experiment in social evolution.
25
 The essential component of the later, more positive assessment 
of the GDR is what Konrad Jarausch characterizes as the “‘legend of the good beginning’, i.e. a 
somewhat nostalgic portrayal of the founding of the GDR as a radical humanist experiment to 
create a better Germany.”26  
In the last decade, however, a new historiography of the GDR has emerged that attempts 
to move scholarship on East Germany along a “middle path between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
interpretive frameworks in order to study the GDR from less polemical ideological 
standpoints.”27  My reading of the present historiographic effort to avoid polemical arguments is 
that the GDR must be evaluated not against the expectation that an “undemocratic and illiberal” 
East Germany was destined to fail; but rather that the collapse of the GDR—whether ultimately a 
matter of gross governmental mismanagement, dictatorial pretense, economic naivety, etc.—was 
conditioned by historical contingency, and that no part of its history was preordained. That being 
said, the notion of “preordainment” itself presents us with another nagging irony in the GDR’s 
history: for if it is necessary to abandon the notion East German Socialism was historically 
guaranteed to fail, it is equally necessary to interrogate with rigorous skepticism the GDR’s self-
conception as the inviolable “victor of history.” 
As Julia Hell contends, the founding narrative of the GDR was one that could not 
assimilate the memory of National Socialism—that is to say it could not proceed with the new 
                                                          
25
 See Konrad H. Jarausch, “Beyond Uniformity: The Challenge of Historicizing the GDR,” in Dictatorship as 
Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. Konrad H. Jaraush (New York: Berhahn Books, 
1999), 4-5; and Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, “Introduction,” in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday 
Culture and Politics, eds. Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 4-5. 
26
 Konrad Jarausch, “Beyond Uniformity,” 4. 
27
 Katherine Pierce and Paul Betts, eds., Socialist Modern” East German Everyday Culture and Politics (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2008), 5. 
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project of a Soviet abetted (or rather, enforced) socialist German state if any continuity with the 
Hitler’s legacy was acknowledged.  This founding strategy of historical revisionism amounted to 
a “legitimacy discourse of antifascism…the idea that the [SED], its state, and, later, its people 
were the ‘victors’ in the battle of history, that they were the victors of history.”28 
 The notion of “historical victory” is one subtexttually present in all SED rhetoric;  but its 
legitimacy rests on a curious teleological assumption, a kind of inversion of historical cause and 
effect: insofar as the (vulgar) Marxist conception of historical progress is taken as gospel, the 
emergence of a socialist East Germany in the rubble of the Nazi state (conceived here as the 
ghastly apex and subsequent implosion of capitalist modernity) was guaranteed, and, in 
ideologically speaking, always already present as ineluctable historical potential. This mode of 
thinking is more than simply basking in the theoretical ether.  The SED’s insistence that the 
GDR was an historical triumph determined rigid ideological parameters outside of which actual 
SED policy (typified in its inter-governmental labor agreement with Vietnam) could be neither 
conceived nor implemented.   
 Further evidence of the overriding influence the ideology of “historical victory” is 
presented by Konrad Jarausch in his assessment of East German historiography, in which 
historians could offer no analysis of the GDR that deviated from the ideological line of historical 
materialism. The achievement of the perfected socialist state—the ineluctable culmination of 
socio-historical progress that the GDR putatively embodied—was a matter of empirical certainty 
that could not be vitiated by any subjective relativism.
29
 Jarausch goes on to claim that this 
refusal of any kind of “subjective relativism” in GDR historiography (that is to say, the effort to 
                                                          
28
 Julia Hell, Post-Fascist Fantasies: Psychoanalysis, History and the Literature of East Germany (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997), 30. 
29
 Konrad H. Jarausch, “The Failure of East German Antifascism: Some Ironies of History as Politics,” Geraman 
Studies Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), 88. 
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maintain a measure of reflexive critical distance from the tendentious influence one’s own 
historical context) ultimately “failed to extirpate the roots of facistoid behavior in the 
authoritarian collaboration and racism of the majority of the [East German] population.”30A 
striking corroboration of the complicity of East German historiography and politics is forwarded 
by Martin Sabrow, who claims that SED functionaries often griped at being “instrumentalized by 
scholarship”, remarking that “they [politicians] were left with the responsibility of making 
historical decisions.”31 
 “Historical decisions,” in the GDR were, however, always at the behest of the socialist 
ideological mission; and, in the case of Vietnamese contract workers, the SED’s decision was to 
remain silent—at least with respect to the dire economic circumstances that truly underwrote the 
importation of tens of thousands Vietnamese laborers over the course of the 1980s.  This silence, 
this willful elision of economic reality in SED rhetoric created a situation in which“few GDR 
citizen’s knew anything about the foreign workers.”32  And, as Klaus Fritsche notes, this silence 
masked a reality utterly at odds with the rhetoric of “internationalist cooperation”: “general 
living conditions were such that it was clear that Vietnamese were not collaborating with the 
GDR as ‘people,’ but rather serving it as machines.”33   
Their status as nonentities, however was to change as the 80s drew to a close and the 
GDR staggered toward collapse.  As consumer goods became more and more scarce, 
competition between native East German’s and the Vietnamese contract workers became a 
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flashpoint of xenophobic tension.  In addition to purchases made for their daily needs, the 
Vietnamese, “according to the labor agreements, were allowed to send home goods worth 50 
percent of their total net income generated during their time in the GDR…this fact brought them 
into conflict with the East German public, who blamed them for empty shop shelves.”34The East 
German population’s resentment of the Vietnamese contract workers was, at its base, a kind of 
“socio-economic chauvinism”; the blame for the increasing scarcity of consumer goods was 
displaced from the real culprit—structural failures in the GDR’s planned economy—onto the 
purchasing power of the Vietnamese.
35
   
The SED’s silence on this matter only served to exacerbate the East German animosity 
toward foreign laborers.  In addition, government policy that intended to keep the Vietnamese 
population sequestered from the native German public—an “’agenda of exclusion’ in which 
ethnic diversity had no established place,”36—ultimately made amicable relations between East 
German’s and Vietnamese even less tenable.  The SED’s ideological cant did little to prepare the 
GDR population for the reality of Vietnamese living among them, sharing valuable resources, 
and evincing cultural attributes that were at wide variance with the German norm.  As Mike 
Dennis has speculated, had the SED been more open about the economic need met by 
Vietnamese labor in the GDR, it is possible that the resentment and animosity felt by East 
Germans could have been curbed. As it stood, however, the East German government chose to 
obfuscate, relying on a rhetorical strategy that endeavored to construct the GDR’s labor 
importation as a matter socialist fraternity with Vietnam.  In what follows, I attempt to unpack 
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this rhetorical strategy, paying special attention to how it elided structural aspects of the labor 
contract, and set the stage for systemic mistreatment of Vietnamese employees in the GDR. 
Chapter one discusses the historical legitimacy of GDR socialism. My approach to this 
problem will consider SED ideology and rhetoric as constitutive of a brand of historical 
metaphysics. More than unreconstructed historicism, socialist ideology in the GDR placed the 
East German state at the apex of the socio-historical teleology revealed—with all the counter-
intuitive trappings of atheistic preterism—in the dogma of Marxism/Lenisim. Central to this 
discussion will be the work of Andreas Glaeser and Roy Rappaport.  Glaeser’s discussion of the 
SED as theodician (as a political class that acknowledged the flaws in socialist practice, but was 
never to blame for those flaws) is central to the development of my ideas about socialist 
metaphysics. Rappaport’s writing on the performative and formal aspects of ritual is an 
indispensible tool for approaching Party rhetoric as fundamentally “constructive,” insofar as 
pronouncements of  GDR socialism’s success created a rhetorical reality that was meant to 
subordinate the “real” reality of socialism in practice. 
Chapter two will discuss at greater length the theoretical problems inherent in GDR 
socialism, providing empirical background, and the nuts and bolts of the contract with Vietnam. 
It will also consider incidents of Vietnamese insubordination and the treatment of those charged 
with infractions as conditioned by the SED ideological line. By the reading official regulations 
for contract labor established by the SED (Ordnungen) against a collection of deportation 
requests (Antägen) generated by East German companies seeking permission to terminate the 
contracts of Vietnamese employees judged for various reasons to be liabilities, I will show that 
official claims of brotherhood and socialist fraternity were often completely disregarded in 
practice. 
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Chapter three will discuss the issue of the East German “public sphere” as a conceptual 
ideal masquerading as an historical reality. Habermas’s Structural Transformations is of course a 
compulsory orientation for this discussion; my use of this work, however, will focus more on 
what Habermas elaborates as an early historical emanation of the “public”: the feudal lord’s 
proprietary access to public representation. It is my contention that the GDR’s version of the 
public sphere resembled more this model of publicness at least insofar as the private was cognate 
with the base and apolitical in East German socialism, hence a citizen’s real value—
theoretically—accrued only to his or her “public” function.  This idea of the realization of the 
socialist individual through and only through the public body (a paradox to be sure) becomes 
even more fractious when foreign nationals are concerned. Insofar as Vietnamese contract 
workers were fraternally bound to the East German citizenry through internationalism, should 
they not also have had the opportunity to realize their potential as individuals in the collective 
through participation in the public sphere? And if it was the case that the public sphere was little 
more than a coercive mirage for East Germans themselves, what did that mean for the 
Vietnamese. I will discuss this question using Eingaben (citizen’s petitions) culled from the 
Bundesarchiv, which detail Vietnamese acts of resistance and insubordination to their East 
German “minders.” 
The fourth and final chapter will discuss reportage of Vietnamese-GDR relations in the 
main SED organ, Neues Deutschland. I will argue in this chapter that the historical reality of 
Vietnamese in East Germany of was little importance to the SED insofar as its public image was 
concerned. Although the Vietnamese became more and more visible in the daily lives East 
Germans over the course of the 1980s, the SED never saw fit to explain to its citizens the true 
nature of the GDR contractual relationship with Vietnam. Neues Deutschland did, however, 
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contain items on Vietnam—and GDR-Vietnamese relations—on an almost daily basis in the 
early 1980s. It is my contention that the regularity with which ND reported on Vietnam was a 
strategy by which the SED attempted to mask the reality of the GDR’s economic dependence on 
contract labor with almost ritualized pronouncements of socialist fraternity. 
` It is my hope that this thesis will not only shed light on a largely unknown facet of 
German history—Vietnamese men and women as essential ballast for the late GDR economy— 
but will make some small contribution to the contemporary effort to write historiography of the 
GDR that approaches the subject with the complexity and nuance it deserves. GDR socialism, I 
maintain throughout this thesis, was no more pre-ordained to collapse than it was to triumph. 
Where criticism is best aimed is precisely where GDR socialism willfully ceased to function as 
socialism conditioned by history, but instead as socialism that somehow was justified by history, 
socialism that believed it gave its approbation to history in turn. This kind of pompous 
sanctimony is not necessarily the patrimony of Marx—though he cannot be fully exculpated—
nor is it ingrained in a particularly German stripe of socialism.  
The failure of the SED and, by extension, the GDR can only be explained by rigorous 
contextualization. This contextualization must not ignore those “subaltern” populations like the 
Vietnamese who were absolutely integral to the functioning of the East German state. It must not 
be forgotten that these Vietnamese men and women exercised agency vis-à-vis that state, were in 
fact constitutive of the GDR; and although the conditions under which they worked were 
oppressive, and the pronouncements of fraternity by the East German government often hollow, 
they were able to carve out a relatively successful niche in East German society. More important 
still, the Vietnamese in the GDR were a vital part of the country’s history. 
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2  METHODOLOGY: SOCIALISM’S PARDOXICAL METAPHYSICS 
A more general discussion of SED ideology and rhetoric is necessary in order to further 
understand the stakes the East German government faced as it styled the presentation of its 
Vertragsarbeiter program to its citizens. Certain structural contradictions in East German 
ideology-cum-historical theory that beset and disrupted the actual practice of “real and existing 
socialism” will help shed light of the conditions under which the Vietnamese were brought to 
East Germany.  Limning the divergence between the “official” attitude the SED held toward 
Vietnamese contract workers and the latter’s actual experience in the GDR, will help to sketch 
the limits and disjunctures inherent in the ideological rigidity that dictated both the SED’s 
communication with the East German public, and the very form and structure of the public itself. 
The investigation at hand is comprised not only by the limits of the SED conception of is 
socialist mission—in contexts both international and domestic—but also, and even more 
importantly by the performative limits that the government’s self-conception enforced. I use the 
word “performative” in this context in an explicitly technical sense: that is to say, and at the 
hazard of redundancy, that rhetoric—and by a kind of backwards extension, ideology—is 
entirely a matter of technique, an historically conditioned yet willful and operative program by 
which the understanding of self and other is manufactured. Put differently, in the present context 
of the GDR, political understanding, knowledge and the practices that emanate thereof were 
coextensive phenomena, circumscribed by what Foucault has termed the “discursive object.”37 
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And this discursive object in the GDR, this object of socialism—in the sense of both socialism as 
a “goal,” and as the de jure, already accomplished East German political system—was one that, 
on a theoretical level, irrationally functioned as its own simultaneous cause and effect.   
Andreas Glaeser’s work on the Stasi speaks directly to this paradox: he presents the GDR’s 
sociopolitical self-understanding as an ideologically conditioned “self-fulfilling prophecy.” This 
self-containment of the political project of socialism—that which must be, ideologically 
speaking, always already accomplished—produced in the GDR a type of “meta-political” 
understanding of the function of the East German state.  Glaeser uses the term meta-
understanding in very much the same way Foucault mobilized his “discursive object”; his 
analytical category, however, is less totalizing than Foucault’s. The case of political meta-
understanding in the GDR is conditioned by certain presumptions about the nature and 
elaboration of socialism. Glaeser maintains the GDR socialism presumed itself to occupy a state 
of incorruptible anteriority to the actual practice of the socialism. The fact remains, however, 
that quotidian interactions with the institutions of GDR socialism (whether they be the Party, the 
Stasi, or the more abstractly conceived “collective”) were at times at radical divergence with 
SED’s ideologically imperative self-understanding.38   
What Glaseser does not explicitly say, but what seems a reasonable conclusion to draw from 
his line of argument, is that, on the level of ideology in the GDR, socialism existed as a kind of 
inexorable, very much ontologically rooted sociopolitical formation. Socialism, in this 
conception, was not something to be made, but something that either already was, or, at a certain 
point in history, would inevitably be.  Of course, on one level this is reducible to a mere function 
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of ideo-rhetorical figures emanating from the state, utterances not guaranteed to be taken 
“seriously” by GDR citizens, and in and of themselves possessing no reactive valence vis-à-vis 
the real body politic (the constant iteration of phrases like “internationalist brotherhood” in the 
press and Party documents, for example, certainly did not assure that East Germans would accept 
Vietnamese contract workers with open arms).  
However, considering that these rhetorical figures were the primary medium by which the 
GDR state addressed its citizens, reducing them to the level of mere abstract, unreconstructed 
rhetoric (used here in the pejorative sense, i.e., that which is ineffectual, solipsistic, socially 
disengaged, empty) would seem to miss the point. As Glaeser astutely avers, generalized, 
discursively constructed “understandings” in given societies—precisely the site, in my 
conception, at which ideology and rhetoric converge and become operative—do not function 
effectively if the reality of day to day life diverges too widely from what institutional knowledge 
had not only prescribed, but, more importantly, predicted: “Whether background understandings 
remain effective in practice...depends entirely on the degree to which the domains of activity 
validating these understandings are actually integrated with the domains of activity in which 
these understandings are employed.”39 
There is stark evidence of this disjuncture in the SED’s explanations and assumptions 
concerning the deployment of a Vietnamese workforce in the GDR. What was presented by the 
SED—and, it must be remembered, presentation in this context is recursive, as the actual facts of 
the 1981 agreement with Vietnam were never publicly disclosed—concerning the labor contracts 
with the SRV assumed that a climate of socialist fraternity was already fully developed in the 
GDR, and that no real “work” would be necessary to accomplish the productive co-existence of 
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East German citizens and what would become a cohort of extra-national labor numbering in the 
tens of thousands.  While it could certainly be argued that the Politburo could not have been so 
callow, so idealistic as to actually believe the inflexible ideological and rhetorical horizons 
demanded of official discourse, it is equally certain that at the level of this discourse, individual, 
subjective doubts were utterly beside the point. As anthropologist Roy A. Rappaport claims in 
his discussion of the formal structures of language in ritual, “acceptance” and “belief” are not 
mutually inclusive categories in ritual practice: “Acceptance is not a private state, but a public 
act.” 40 In effect, reality was as the Party claimed it to be, even if this understanding did not 
reflect the actual, brute facts of socialist practice among the diurnal body politic—even if it did 
not reflect that secret, personal convictions of members of the government who tirelessly 
pronounced it into being. 
All this makes a certain amount of sense when considering how the SED sought to represent 
itself to the public in popular press organs like Neues Deutschland; propaganda, one would think, 
is universally regarded as spurious, even if those people whom it targets choose to accept it 
without protest. And at the risk of making hazardous generalizations, it is the case that all 
modern states—democratic republics included—often willfully misrepresent themselves to their 
citizens. In the case of the GDR, however, what is interesting about this state-driven obfuscation 
and misinformation is on the one hand its highly formalized (in fact ritualized) character, and on 
the other, its persistence even in the realm of Party discourse that was never intended for public 
consumption.  
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It is essential to stress at this point that this argument is not meant to engage the GDR, its 
people, or even its political leadership on the level of indictment. A schism between theory and 
practice is certain to exist in all political systems, and certainly also existed in the in the FRG 
with respect to its Guest Worker program.
41
 What I wish to explicate within this analysis is the 
very peculiar slippage between SED ideological rhetoric and “real and existing socialism.” This 
slippage is, I believe, partly constitutive of the GDR regime’s failure, of the failure of the Soviet 
sponsored communism/socialism on the whole. Returning to the earlier discussion of GDR 
historians chastened by SED officials for leaving them to do the “historical work,” we see stark 
evidence of the largely insoluble paradox of East German socialist thought: the historian’s work, 
what was expected of him of her by the Politburo, was very much to provide empirical, social-
scientific justification for SED policy. The problem with this, however, is immediately apparent: 
very much like criticisms leveled at funtionalist anthropology,
42providing “explanations,” 
historical or otherwise, for cultural, social or political phenomena in the service of an ideological 
paradigm that already assumes the nature of these explanations amounts to nothing more than 
logical fallacy—a colossal instance of begging the question, in which the conclusions drawn are 
in effect predetermined by the ideological parameters within which the investigation proceeded.  
History in the service of SED ideology was inseparable from that ideology; and it was 
expected to enforce assumptions about the genesis, development and present condition of 
historical socialism that were to be taken as virtually sacred warrants before any investigation 
into the nature of socialism as historical phenomenon began.  As Glaeser argues, the SED’s 
conception of its historical mission amounted to a type of theodicy. Governed by the adherence 
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to the “absolute truth of the substance of Marxism/Leninism as the only true social science 
corroborated by the movement of history,” any failure or destabilization of the socialist state, 
once it was achieved—and because the socialist state amounted to the very entelechy of history 
itself, it could not fail to be achieved—was the result of either enemy intrigue or on an individual 
or individuals within the state who had not, for all the Party’s diligence, arrived at the desired 
level of “historical consciousness.” As Glaser succinctly puts it, “given that this form of failure 
accounting [always caused by an agent external to the state] involves the defense of an absolute 
it is properly addressed as a form of theodicy.” And this theodician justification for the existence 
of socialism in the GDR effectively insulated the SED against criticism,
43
 as the Party and 
history in this conception existed in a realm autonomous and ideal, and there was to be 
absolutely no separation between them. 
 Roy Rappaport’s analysis of the formal structures of ritual practice is illuminating with 
regard to the present discussion of SED ideology as “absolute.” While his anthropological 
intervention in human ritual is decidedly synchronic—that is to say, at least superficially, of 
uncertain use to historical inquiry—I believe that several of the structural elements he identifies 
as universally constitutive of ritual as form to be strikingly similar to SED rhetorical practice 
(rhetoric here conceived as ideology on an operative register).  That being said, it is important to 
make clear that these “formal” components of ritual practice are, when immersed in unique 
historical contexts, always mobilized to achieve different political, social and economic ends. 
What is, however, justly attributed to ritual in all contexts—and what permits a level of 
synchronic generalization—is that wherever and whenever one locates ritual practice in a society 
(whether it functions as a medium of sanctification, or as the rhetorical condensation of 
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“atheistic” ideology, as was the case with the SED), its primary utility is the promotion of social 
cohesion. The East German government’s professions of “fraternity” and “internationalist 
cooperation,” their ubiquitous and highly formalized iteration, occupied a destabilized rhetorical 
territory in which that which had already been achieved (the absolute, historically guaranteed 
conditions of state socialism) was in effect incessantly, and with profound anxiety, pronounced 
into being, performed. 
 Foundational to the ritual as formal practice is signification as performative act. While 
signification is a broad category, encompassing gesture, posture, and certainly a host of non-
linguistic sensory cues ranging across fields visual, haptic, auditory and olfactory—in the case 
GDR rhetoric as ritual, my investigation will be limited to performative verbal articulations: acts 
of speech and inscription that intend to bring their very content into being. As Rappaport points 
out, ritualized speech acts—utterances that “achieve conventional effects”—function to produce 
a real transformation of states within social relations of a given society. In the case of ritualized 
naming of an object or a person (as is in evidence, for instance, with the SED declaring within 
the pages of Neues Deutschland: “with the Vietnamese we are bound as brothers”), the naming 
itself “not only constitutes an action but actually brings into being the state of affairs with which 
it is concerned [and hence] is performative.” This state of transformation holds true—within the 
liturgical context—whether or not all members of a given society decide to act in accordance 
with what the act of naming has brought into being. And this assertion of particular importance 
with regard to the rhetorical performance of the SED—as Rapport goes on to explain, “the force 
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of perfomatives does not depend in any simple way and direct way upon the effect of these acts 
and utterances upon the minds and hearts of those exposed to them.” 44 
 The notion of state of affairs successfully effected through a ritual act that is potentially, 
simultaneously ineffective vis-à-vis it observance in the lives of men and women outside the 
liturgical context may seem at first an intractable contradiction.  But, as discussed earlier, belief 
and acceptance are not conterminous as far individual participation in social institutions is 
concerned.  For an East German citizen to have accepted the SED’s insistence on his fraternal 
bond with his Vietnamese partner in socialism did not require that he actually believed in that 
filial—or, for that matter, world-historical—affinity. And at the rhetorical level, those 
pronouncements which issued from the GDR state in a real but formally circumscribed way 
actually created the very conditions of socialist fraternity that were putatively already 
historically vouchsafed. As Glaeser discusses, the absolute nature of SED political ideology—its 
historically corroborated “theodicy”—made the conditions of the accomplished socialist state—
and all the fraternal bonds with other “partners in socialism” that those conditions assured—
historically inexorable.  Any deviation from the socialist ideal was not—could not be—imputed 
to the failure of the party, which would have meant the failure of socialism itself; failure, rather, 
was always suffered by the state, the result of the external interference of agents who had not yet 
come around to its historical truth.  
 This theodician formulation of GDR socialism exhibits a very peculiar feature: it inverts 
the conventional correspondence of statements about the world and the world these statements 
are intended to describe. In the day-to-day world, a statement is considered true if it corresponds 
to observable reality; a statement is false if it inaccurately represents empirical conditions. While 
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this may seem too basic to be worth mentioning, it becomes important when the SED is 
considered as absolute, as theodician. On the ideological level, it is of no consequence if that 
which the SED states about the world does not, in fact, reflect the actual conditions of the world. 
The divergence between what the East German government pronounces about the state of 
socialism and the latter’s “real and existing” conditions amounts to what Rappaport would 
classify as a “Vedic lie.”  In the case of an individuals who transgress the conventional order that 
ritual practice has brought into being, what is effected are “states of affairs that...do not conform 
to prevailing liturgically established orders [and] are the inverse of ‘vulgar lies,’ statements that 
their transmitters believe misrepresent the state of affairs which they purport to report.”45 
Iterations of the socialist state as already accomplished were, for the SED the main rhetorical 
strategy by which it, in effect, pursued its legitimacy as that which had already been 
incontrovertibly established. In the chapters that follow, I will discuss this ideological nostrum , 
the always already accomplished state of “historical” socialism,  to which the SED appealed 
time and time again in order to shore up its legitimacy.  
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3 DIE PARTEI HAT IMMER RECHT: THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF 
VIETNAMESE CONTRACT WOKERS  
The disconnection between a blinkered return to inflexible central planning, and the real 
fracture points in the command economy in effect created the circumstances under which 
Vietnamese laborers were sought after by GDR companies. Unfortunately for the Vietnamese, 
this same disconnection extended to the “official” version of their status as residents of the GDR, 
and their actual treatment at the hands of their East German employers. This chapter endeavors 
to understand the ideological impasse of GDR socialism as a kind of background before which 
the actual daily politics between Vietnamese workers and their East German bosses took place. 
Relying on communications between GDR companies and local government agencies, I will 
show how ideology consistently failed to contain the full range of the contract workers 
experience; and how contracts that structured Vietnamese labor in the GDR by their very 
paternalism discouraged equality and integration. 
3.1 The Failure of Central Planning 
The gulf between what the SED claimed East German socialism to have achieved (whether 
it be a classless state, the triumph over racism, imperialism, etc.) and the disparate facts “on the 
ground” created a destabilized nation that could simply not bear the shocks of the global 
economic and political events of 1970s and 1980s. Socialist orthodoxy in the GDR would not 
(and could not) countenance the failure of intensified economic rationalization in meeting the 
needs of the East German citizenry.  Ideological bias notwithstanding, historians tend to agree 
that Honecker’s decision to systematically dismantle Ulbricht’s economic reform was a major 
contributor to the eventual collapse of the GDR. Ulbricht’s New Economic System of Planning 
and Management (NES) had been designed to achieve rapprochement between the SED and the 
East German populace—in the absence of the regime’s legitimacy, it was at the very least vital 
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that the population’s basic material needs be consistently met. Ulbricht’s plan to achieve this end 
was to spur technological innovation, and to inaugurate a hybridization of the command 
economy (which produced goods largely within a fixed pricing structure) and a more market 
driven, “profit based” economic model. 46  
These reform measures, however, were rolled back under Honecker, and economic policy 
was gradually steered back to heavy reliance on central planning. Honecker believed that worker 
productivity—hence, the GDR’s economic health—would be guaranteed if the basic material 
needs of every citizen were met by the state; along these lines, he nearly tripled state spending on 
social programs over the course of the 1980s.
47
 It is worth noting the circular nature of this 
thinking: meeting the conditions of socialism would, in effect, produce the economic yield to 
ensure the attainment of functioning socialist state.
48
 This approach was based on a refractory, 
ideologically calcified, quasi-metaphysical conception of not only the function of the SED, but 
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the nature of socialism itself. In response the suggestion that the social spending demanded by 
the SED’s ‘Main Task’ would only worsen the GDR’s already considerable hard currency debt, 
Honecker claimed that such contentions were “tantamount to sabotaging the decisions of the 
Party Congress.”49  The SED insisted that the GDR’s strategy of central economic planning was 
fundamentally sound; and, as Honecker made clear, any doubts about this thinking amounted to a 
cardinal breach of faith in the Party.  The reality of the situation, however, was the level of social 
spending that the Honecker regime deemed necessary to keep East German socialism on the rails 
(again, a circular conception that assumed the conditions of socialism would lead to socialism) 
exacerbated and already unwieldy trade deficit—not only with other COMECON nations (the 
Soviet Union in particular) but, since the General Treaty with the FRG in 1972, with the 
capitalist West as well. The global oil crisis in 1979 brought this deficit to crisis level. As the 
GDR had traditionally relied on the import of cheap raw materials from the Soviet Union—
petroleum foremost among these—the spike in energy prices hit East Germany particularly hard.  
In an effort to attack the trade imbalance by ramping up exports, the GDR established a 
compulsory third shift system in basic goods industries, and raised production quotas to the point 
that the pool of native East German workers was insufficient to meet the country’s labor 
demands. 
3.2 Abkommen 
 It was as economic conditions deteriorated that the 1980 labor contracts with Vietnam 
were enacted. Setting aside all the pious cant and self-congratulatory Party rhetoric that spun 
GDR –Vietnamese relations as matter of paternalist socialist outreach, in 1980, the SED, staring 
at the hard reality of a moribund economy, looked to Vietnam for labor, and for labor alone.  But 
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resorting to large scale importation of foreign workers was an admission that the GDR could not 
respond to the world economic crisis in a manner consistent with the new party program set forth 
in 1976 “whereby in return for an acceptable standard of living the citizens would tacitly, if 
unenthusiastically, were supposed to accept the party’s claim to be the leading force in 
society.”50  The Party simply could not make this fact public without vitiating the legitimacy of 
its rule.   
As the pronouncements of the SED Party Congress were intended to have the force and 
authority of a Holy Writ, to present the relations with Vietnam for what they really were—a 
fairly desperate measure aimed at nothing less than saving GDR socialism from collapse—would 
have been not only tantamount to political suicide, but, on a fundamental level, a rhetorical 
impossibility. Put another way, the ideological-cum-theoretical horizon of the SED’s self-
conception (that is to say, in Foucauldian terms, the discursive limits of official GDR socialism) 
simply would not permit the “facts” of the 1980 labor contract with Vietnam to be made public. 
As a government plagued by constant threat of the charge of illegitimacy, recourse to historical 
and theoretical justifications for its rule demanded that the SED vet the reality of its situation—
the “facts” on the ground—as of secondary importance. The importation of tens of thousands of 
Vietnamese nationals into the East German work force could not be represented to the public as 
redress for the Party’s economic mismanagement.  At most, the presence of these foreigner 
laborers in East German shops was evidence of dialectical materialism at work: the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, having lately overcome its imperialist oppressors, now required tutelage of 
a more advanced GDR socialism. If the SED represented the 1980 contract to the public in any 
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other way, it would have had to admit its failings—and that admission would fatally undermine 
its ability to rule. 
Curiously, it was not just in its public announcements that the SED relied on the vague 
terminology of “internationalism” and “brotherhood” as a gloss and justification for its foreign 
labor programs.  As Annegret Schüle notes, a February 1986 Resolution of the GDR Council of 
Ministers states that “the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s offer to supply a total of 17, 570 
Vietnamese for productive education in GDR will be used” to compensate for critical production 
short falls in children’s clothing and shoes.51  Schüle correctly maintains that the rhetorical figure 
of “productive education of Vietnamese worker” operated “euphemistically” to distract from—or 
at least attenuate—the fact that East Germany’s command economy was insufficient to meet the 
material needs of its population.
52
  What she does not address, however, is that this 
“euphemistic” language in fact marks a kind of discursive horizon for the GDR’s brand of 
socialism, one that utterly foreclosed the possibility any official admission of the state’s failings.   
This assertion is further borne out by the schizoid parlance of the GDR Council of 
Ministers.  The resolution in question plainly acknowledges grave labor shortages:  “For the 
protection and achievement of part of the Four Year Plan the actual deficit in light industry labor 
(a shortage of 4,600 workers in 1986; and approximately 5,000 in 1987) must be compensated 
for.”53 But, in the next sentence, the matter of fact assessment of the GDR’s labor dearth—one 
that absolutely demands the further importation of Vietnamese workers—is effectively displaced 
by a rhetorical mode of decidedly paternalistic “internationalist brotherhood.”  The Vietnamese 
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government has “offered” close to 20,000 more of its citizens to the GDR so that they can benefit 
from “productive education” in East German industries.  The GDR’s posture of largesse towards 
its ephebic “socialist friend” is implicit in this language: regardless of the real economic motives 
behind Vietnamese contract labor in the GDR, official discourse insists—is ideologically bound 
to insist—that the SED’s true mission is to foster the international proletariat.  
What is most important in the present discussion, however, is the SED’s fundamental 
assumption—and, in terms of establishing its legitimacy, this assumption was indispensible—
that whatever policy it enacted, whatever rhetorical posture it took, it was always historically 
justified. The SED demonstrated its belief in its infallibility again and again in the rhetorical 
figures it disseminated to the East German population. A startling crass and direct example of 
this rhetoric can be found in the official anthem of the SED Die Partei hat immer recht (the Party 
is always right): 
The Party, the Party, the Party is always right, 
And, comrades, it will stay that way. 
For who fights for the what’s right is always right 
Against lies and exploitation. 
54
 
 
 One could hardly offer more striking evidence of the chauvinistic force of Party 
orthodoxy. Pronouncements—functionally, utterances of truth— made by the SED within the 
given historical conditions of state socialism were to be accepted as if they were simultaneously 
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of divine provenance and matters of an unerring, social-scientific deduction.  Socialism as a 
brand of historical Platontism—the Party itself occupying the role of the “ideal”—not only made 
the SED right in its every iteration,  but “since the ideals were always projected into an 
inescapable ‘happy future,’ obvious shortcomings and contradictions of the here and now were 
ultimately irrelevant. They were by-products of change, and thus—from a dialectical 
standpoint—evidence of progress.”55 
The official justification and implicit directive issuing from the SED to its citizens 
concerning the importation of Vietnamese labor occupied a territory that one not immersed in the 
contemporaneous social context would probably see as untenable: the men and women who 
traveled from Vietnam to close productions gaps in the GDR were presented in the official 
press—not to mention in the text of the 1980 agreement itself—in emphatically filial terms, and 
yet, from its inception, policy that brought Vietnamese workers to the GDR in no way intended 
that they stand on equal footing, much less that they be assimilated, with the native East German 
public. What drove the labor contract with Vietnam at the rhetorical level was the putative will to 
promote cooperation, brotherhood, socialist fraternity and internationalist solidarity; and yet, a 
closer look at the text of the 1980 agreement belies these more noble claims. The introduction to 
the articles of the contract proceeds as follows:  
Guided by the wish to deepen the brotherly cooperation between the two countries and 
[proceeding] on the basis of a mutual interest in the temporary employment and training 
of Vietnamese workers in the enterprises of the German Democratic Republic, the 
government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam have concluded this agreement.
56
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Leading with the formalized and undeviating invocation of “brotherly cooperation,” the contract 
continues in Article I to further clarify the practical and ideological parameters within which the 
agreement is to be enacted: 
This employment is associated with the acquisition and extension of practical 
occupational experience in the processes of production, as well as with occupational 
training and continuing education within the framework of adult on-the-job training.
57
 
 
What is interesting about the verbiage of this particular article of the agreement is the recourse 
taken to “occupational training and continuing education” as an explanation for the labor 
program. The SED’s paternalist rhetoric of internationalist cooperation with Vietnam provided a 
kind of stock explanation for the increasing visibility of Vietnamese laborers the in the GDR.  It 
must be noted, however, that prior to 1980 foreign workers were in fact recruited for reasons 
more closely in line with SED’s pronouncements of fraternity and education. Vietnamese who 
came to the East Germany in the 1960s and 70s were represented by official propaganda as 
partners in “’work force cooperation’ within the framework of ‘socialist economic integration’… 
as long as the GDR was economically superior to other socialist states, workers could come from 
those states to ‘build socialism in their homeland.’”58   
As it turned out, with 1980 agreement, the labor displaced any charitable programs 
geared toward the “professional training ” of Vietnamese nationals in the GDR.59  Curiously, the 
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text of the contract itself fails to fully register this policy shift: the compulsion to conceal 
economic realities in the GDR with ideological panaceas prevails over the facts on the ground. It 
is also interesting to note that this stratagem is not without precedent—even during a period 
when the foreign labor importation in the GDR hewed more closely to the official explanation of 
vocational training and education of socialist brothers. A letter written in July 1973 by Horst 
Sinderman (GDR Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and sent to Erich Honecker reveals that 
the SED saw its foreign labor agreements as primarily economic in character well before it 
entered into its contract with the SRV.  Sindermann warned Honecker that: “We must not appear 
as a ‘guest worker country’…Hence we can only conclude an agreement on the ‘training and 
qualification’…of workers.”60  
It is certainly justifiable to maintain that Sinderman’s anxiety about the perception of the 
GDR foreign labor policy stemmed from a concern that it should be compared to the 
Gastarbeiter programs in the FRG; but what underwrote that anxiety was the fact that analogous 
foreign labor arrangements in West Germany were in unabashedly presented as primarily 
economic in nature (albeit in a way that would supposedly be positive for both the FRG and for 
those that came from abroad in search of work).
61
 Sinderman makes clear that no matter what the 
real impetus for foreign labor in GDR, it must presented as strictly adhering to ideological 
principles, and in no way betray any weakness in the East German economy.  
 While the language of the first article of the agreement conflicts with the empirical data 
available concerning the actual state of the GDR’s economy and the real agenda behind “socialist 
cooperation,” article II constructs an unintended rhetorical aporia, one that exposes a stubborn 
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hypocrisy in the SED’s internationalist mission:  “The Vietnamese workers shall live in the 
German Democratic Republic without family members. In exceptional cases it is possible for 
both husband and wife to be employed on the basis of the agreement.”62 While on a practical 
level it would seem reasonable to discourage workers whose status was, by the terms of the 
contract, temporary from establishing a true “home” environment in the GDR, an explicit clause 
prohibiting Vietnamese families from traveling together to work in East Germany runs utterly 
contrary to the agreement’s previously stated “wish to deepen the brotherly cooperation between 
the two countries.” This clause, taken in concert with the fact that Vietnamese women who 
became pregnant during their stay in the GDR were either forced to have an abortion or 
summarily sent back to the SRV does much to undermine the East German government’s posture 
of benevolent host to its Vietnamese comrades.
63
   
3.3 Ordnungen/Anträge 
In a Regulation (Ordnung) issued by the State’s Secretary of Labor and Compensation 
(Arbeit und Löhne) in March of 1987, the  GDR adjusted somewhat its official policy toward 
pregnancy among Vietnamese women working in East Germany. While still officially 
proscribed, the SED acknowledged that in certain circumstances, pregnancies would not only 
have to be carried to term, but deliveries would also have to be permitted in the GDR. Of course, 
it was stressed in the Regulation that pregnant laborers were not what the East German 
government envisioned when it entered into the labor agreement with Vietnam; but the reality of 
the situation—men and women working together and living in the same barracks inevitably 
entering into intimate relationships—could not be ignored forever. Acknowledging this, the SED 
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soft-peddled its distaste for the more “human” behavior of its foreign labor cohorts, and gave 
pregnant Vietnamese women the opportunity to use their vacation time to return to the SRV 
when their babies were due. If a woman took advantage of this concession, her contract with her 
GDR employer would not be terminated. The GDR also acknowledged in the 1987 Regulation 
that there did exist circumstances in which a pregnant woman’s health would permit neither 
abortion nor a flight back to Vietnam; in such cases, it was stipulated that the company for which 
the pregnant woman worked, and the “local state agencies,” would provide for the needs of 
mother and child.    
All this new flexibility notwithstanding, the SED strongly encouraged pregnant 
Vietnamese laborers should very seriously consider abortion or repatriation—and this 
encouragement was to be echoed by not only the individual’s barracks supervisor and company 
“group leader,” but by any concerned representatives of the Vietnamese diplomatic envoy in the 
GDR—before burdening the East German state with a foreigner infant ward. Articles 1 and 2 of 
the Ordnung spell out this preference: 
The goal of the workforce cooperation is the simultaneous employment and qualification 
[i.e. training/education] of young foreign workers in the national industries of the GDR 
for a period of five years.  It is appropriate to note that in order to ensure that female 
workers are able to meet the concurrent demands of work and technical qualification in 
GDR industry, pregnancy is discouraged. Pursuant to this, it is incumbent upon GDR 
businesses—in cooperation with state healthcare facilities and [Vietnamese] delegates in 
the GDR—to inform female workers of the availability of birth control and abortion.64 
 
The subtext of the above directive cannot be ignored: the SED simply did not want to 
have foreign nationals giving birth and—even more—potentially starting families in the GDR. 
                                                          
64
 SAPMO/BAB D434/23799, Ordnung über Aufgaben der Betreibe und örlichen Staatsorgane im Zusammenhang 
mit der Swangerschaft vietnamesischer Frauen, die auf der Grundlage zweiseitiger Regierungsabkommen zeitweilig 
in Betreiben der DDR arbeitren. 
38 
 
There are certainly practical reasons for this, especially considering the immense increase in 
social spending under Honecker: if the entire reason that the Vietnamese were being brought to 
East Germany was to combat economic crisis, then to add superfluous numbers to the social 
welfare rolls would be grossly counterproductive.  And the case of Vietnamese women having 
children while working in the GDR would be doubly burdensome to the state, as not only would 
a cost be incurred for the healthcare of mother and child, but the productive capacity of a 
pregnant worker—not to mention a new mother—would be significantly diminished, if not 
entirely lost.  
The spirit of the 1980 agreement—if not, precisely, the letter—did, however, indicate that 
the GDR was extending a kind of service to the SRV, an opportunity to educate its young men 
and women in the socialist tradition. No mention is made in the agreement of a dire labor 
shortage that threatened to destroy the East German nation. And no mention is made of 
contingent developments in the importation of a Vietnamese labor force—say, pregnancy or 
illness— that may have run contrary to its presence in the GDR in the first place. Built into the 
contract was a stipulated 5 year employment rotation. This duration was long enough to acquire 
the necessary level of education and skill at a given job and then to discharge that skill in an 
effort to help the GDR in meeting its onerous production quotas; but it was not enough time, so 
the SED intended, for Vietnamese men and women to establish actual “lives,” or start families in 
East Germany. And again, there were what could be considered “practical” reasons for barring 
the Vietnamese from real integration into East German society; but there is no way to square 
these practical considerations with the explicit claims of SED rhetoric concerning its mission vis-
à-vis bringing Vietnamese to the GDR.  Never did Party rhetoric deviate from the proclamation 
that the Vietnamese were guests of GDR socialism, that they were welcomed into the East 
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German state as “brothers and sisters” (albeit always cast in the role of younger and 
inexperienced sibling) in the international family of the ascendant working class. But how could 
this talk of socialism’s filial bonds be taken seriously when the SED sought—despite its rhetoric, 
and in the face of the letter of Party orthodoxy—to prevent Vietnamese workers from having 
their immediate families with (or, for that matter, starting families) while they pitched in for the 
socialist cause in the GDR? 
The labor contract signed with Vietnam in 1980 explicitly stated that Vietnamese workers 
were to have the same rights as East Germans. Articles 4 and 5 of the 1980 labor agreement with 
the SRV provide that: 
On the basis of this agreement Vietnamese workers employed in the German Democratic 
Republic have the same rights and duties as East German workers… The businesses of 
the German Democratic Republic will conclude the labor contracts with Vietnamese 
workers, which will stipulate the duration of employment, in both German and 
Vietnamese. The contracts will also stipulate the mutual rights and duties extended to the 
Vietnamese workers.
65
 
It is interesting to note, however, that the individual “rights” stipulated in the above 
clause were severely curtailed by their conceptual obverse: “duty” to socialism. Article 5 of the 
agreement, after having explicitly put Vietnamese workers on equal footing with their East 
German counterparts, briskly moves forward to enumerate the conditions under which any rights 
the Vietnamese had initially been granted could be summarily revoked.  A Vietnamese worker’s  
contract could be dissolved, and his or her return to Vietnam compelled, by infringements of 
“duty” including but not limited to: “violation of GDR penal law or repeated commission of 
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other violations of rights and liberties (Rechtsverletzungen); and serious violations of socialist 
work discipline (Arbeitsdisziplin).
66
  
Company maintenance of socialist or workplace discipline—two categories that were 
almost mutually inclusive—was a tool that offered GDR employers a power over Vietnamese 
laborers that could not be brought to bear on native East Germans: the right to actual deport the 
offender. Although the contract with Vietnam did stipulate that Vertragsarbeiter would have the 
same “rights” as East German workers, it also, in the same clause, insisted that the Vietnamese 
shoulder the same “obligations” as GDR citizens. Of course, these “obligations” were never 
explicitly enumerated, even though each Vietnamese worker was expected to be fully aware of 
the responsibilities of an upright socialist citizen. 
Unfortunately, for many Vietnamese working in the GDR, lack of awareness or 
incomplete understanding what constituted Rechverletzungen of worker discipline led to 
punishment as severe as early termination of employment contracts and deportation to Vietnam. 
As it was not uncommon for Vietnamese men and women to go into considerable debt in an 
effort to secure work in the GDR in the first place—placement in the GDR often required bribing 
Vietnamese officials, and the bribes could sometimes only be afforded through loans taken out 
from Chinese creditors who charged usurious interest—contract termination and forced 
repatriation could be disastrous.
67
  
If a Vietnamese worker was charged with a breach of conduct as stipulated in the inter-
governmental agreement, a representative of the accusing business would proceed to send a 
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request for contract termination to the State’s Secretary for Employment and Compensation, 
(SAL) the GDR body that oversaw the implementation contract labor. These requests (Anträge) 
were many cases remarkably vague concerning the exact nature of Vietnamese misconduct—a 
fact that gives pause considering the severity of the punishment often being sought. In a request 
sent for deportation from VEB Polygraph Druckmaschinewerke in Leipzig to the SAL in 
October of 1982, it is claimed that although Vietnamese worker Tran (last name deleted) had 
successfully completed his training in German language instruction and had been integrated into 
the print shop’s daily production, he had subsequently demonstrated that: 
He is not at all capable of operating machinery or successfully completing other job 
tasks. Through his irresponsible actions, he puts himself and others at risk. It is not in any 
way feasible that he be left unattended in the plant. After a detailed medical examination, 
it has been established that he is of no use to this enterprise. Therefore, we urgently 
request that this colleague be sent home.
68
 
As no copy of a response to this request is available, it cannot be known if the SAL granted VEB 
Polygraph its request to terminate Tran’s contract. It can, however, be safely inferred that it was 
not terribly difficult to terminate and deport a Vietnamese worker, as there appears to have been 
no expectation that a company prove the misconduct deemed punishable. In the case of this 
Antrag it was sufficient for the company to simply claim that the worker had behaved in a way 
that proved him incapable of performing his job duties, and that he was irresponsible to the point 
of putting himself and other employees at risk. Curiously, the request for termination closes with 
mention of a medical examination (though no specific malady, physical or psychological, is 
cited), possibly in an effort to corroborate and give credibility to the company’s accusations. 
Recourse to medical opinion was not, however, a necessary step for GDR companies seeking to 
terminate Vietnamese workers. 
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In another Antrag from VEB Polygraph Leipzig in 1982—his time sent to the Minister of 
Tool and Machine Processes in Berlin—“colleague” Dao (last name deleted) is accused of 
having had an ongoing and inappropriate relationship with a sixteen year old girl, which led to 
the girl becoming pregnant. The request goes on to state: “It was determined by the medical 
commission that the pregnancy had progressed too far for an abortion to be considered.”69 Two 
important points can be taken from this mention of the pregnancy. First, the fact that the 
inadvisability of an abortion is discussed at all suggests that there may be a concern here more 
alarming to the state than the mere insubordination of a foreign worker. If the young girl Dao 
impregnated had also been Vietnamese, one wonders if any mention of her health (or the health 
of her child to be) would have been made. And as it would be contrary to the conditions set forth 
in the 1980 agreement for a 16 year old girl to come to the GDR from Vietnam, it seems very 
possible that the pregnant teenager referred to in this Antrag may have been German. Proceeding 
from this assumption, the question arises whether or not the girl would have been advised against 
terminating the pregnancy had she been Vietnamese. 
This Antrag goes on to claim: “Despite intense discussion with the Vietnamese group 
leader, the existing relationship with the underage girl has not been terminated.” Next, with 
absolutely no effort to transition into what could easily be read as a pretext for Dao’s 
deportation—as if his relationship with the girl is somehow not cause enough—the complaint 
registers that: 
Colleague Dao has experienced great difficulties completing his [work]. His average 
completion rate in 1981 was 85%. Overall, in the last 3 months, his work has been very 
erratic. In January of 1982 his completion rate was 63%. The quality of his work is also 
below average. Continuing instructions from his supervisors concerning his work were 
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not heeded. Further, Colleague Dao has had to be admonished about order and 
cleanliness in the shop, and about the upkeep of machinery.
70
 
 
No mention is made of what is to happen to the girl once Dao is sent back to Vietnam 
(and, again, no response from the government agency in receipt of this Antrag is available). If 
the girl in question was in fact German, her pregnancy with a Vietnamese man would have 
certainly been the stuff of scandal. As historian Eva Kolinsky discovered in her interviews with 
former Vietnamese contract workers and their East German supervisors, for all the SED’s 
insistence that the Vietnamese were guests of the GDR to be treated as equals, as “brothers,” the 
true—if implicit—directive from the state was that no form of Vietnamese integration into the 
East German population take place. Frau W., a former assistant to a regional Foreigners’ 
Commission in East Germany makes this point home in no uncertain terms: 
In GDR times, one did not have contacts with the Vietnamese. They lived secluded, 
completely separate. They had their own shifts in the factories, they spoke very little 
German. This is what it was like, and it was not wanted that East Germans should have 
contacts with them. It was directed from above. There were no events outside the hostels. 
Nobody questioned it. This is what it was like. There were always German minders, but 
ordinary contact did not exist between Germans and Vietnamese at the time.
71
 
 
Regardless if the young girl discussed in the above Antrag was German or Vietnamese, it 
is clear that she and the Vietnamese worker with whom she had the relationship were able—at 
least for a time—to avoid the controls put in place by the East German state. Whether or not the 
girl had the child—or if Dao was able to remain in the GDR to raise it—are questions this 
research cannot answer. A process did, however, exist in the GDR by which East German 
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citizens and foreign workers alike were able to petition the SED to correct occasions of injustice 
and, in some cases, beg clemency for an unintended transgression. This process, the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of Eingabe, was what came closest in the GDR to public 
participation in government, to citizens taking an active role in civic life. In the next chapter, I 
will discuss a series of Eingaben written by a Vietnamese woman who worked in Leipzig, 
considering her petition to the East German state in the context of the possibilities and 
limitations of the GDR public sphere. 
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4   “I WILL NOT LEAVE BEFORE MY TIME”: VIETNAMESE ACCESS TO  
      THE GDR PUBLIC SPHERE 
There has been considerable debate among historians about the East German public 
sphere. It is an unavoidable question whether any derivation of Habermas’s classic model of a 
privately founded (and, for that matter, funded) public existed within a state that used 
“democracy” as a pretext to establish, without mandate, the fifty year entrenchment of a single 
political class. Put differently, what has lately been investigated by historians of the GDR is 
whether or not—and again, irony bears forth—a “public sphere” can in fact exist in a political 
system that at least superficially resembled a polity of dictatorial “publicness.”  In the more 
simplistic and (ideologically biased) accounts of life in the GDR, the native East German public 
is represented as functioning entirely at the behest of the state: but for the grace of the SED goes 
East Germany.  Other historians have explored phenomena like the process of individual 
petition, or Eingabe, that GDR citizens were guaranteed by the SED as potential evidence of a 
sanctioned territory for free expression, and even criticism of the state. 
72
 
This chapter considers in part a series of Engaben written by a Vietnamese woman 
working in Leipzig in 1985. Her communication with the state exhibited a genuine attempt to 
exercise some control over her fate as she faced deportation for breaking a law she did not know 
existed. What is most extraordinary about her Eingaben is that, read alongside the local 
government’s assessment and mismanagement of her case, it becomes clear that this contract 
worker most certainly did not fit the stereotype of passive docility often ascribed the Vietnamese 
in the GDR. In fact, this particular worker exhibited no small amount of guile, and ultimately 
slipped away from authorities who intended to send her back to Vietnam. It is precisely this 
point, where a contract worker attempts to simultaneously cooperates with the state and negotiate 
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with it on her own terms, that something like public participation occurred for Vietnamese in 
East Germany.  I will take up the details of this particular contract worker’s Eingaben later in the 
chapter; but first, it is necessary to outline a few of the peculiarities of the GDR public sphere.  
2.1 The GDR Public: Every Man a King? 
Whatever institutional structures constituted, or aped, a “public sphere” in the GDR—that 
is, the limitations and shortcomings of the later—they were at least partly responsible for the 
government’s collapse in 1989.  The GDR’s failure to recognize the limitations of how it 
demanded its body politic be both ritualized and dramatized over East Germany’s fifty year 
existence served to accentuate an indelible weakness in the state; and those practices and public 
demonstrations intended to legitimize and make “natural” the state apparatus actually functioned 
to undermine the SED’s legitimacy, precisely because the public which the state purported to 
embody was one pre-fabricated and, in effect, unilaterally levied on the East German population. 
The foundational mythologies of the resilient, ineradicable German antifas as the progenitors of 
the East German state (conveniently eliding the Soviet role in that development), along with the 
social-scientific guarantee of socialism’s “historical victory,” these twin buttresses of SED’s 
right to govern as it saw fit, were really nothing more than specious, a priori justifications for a 
coercive—and some would still maintain dictatorial—government that ruled a public without 
that public’s explicit consent.   
On the theoretical level, the GDR’s conception of itself as a thoroughly and indisputably 
“public” body prior to any “practice” of the state vis-à-vis its public—or of an autonomous 
public as an agent of consent or resistance to the East German state—created a model socialist 
society, a kind of Platonic socialism that, of course, never had a diurnal analog; but this mode 
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still functioned to delimit the ways in which the state would conceptualize, justify and 
communicate itself to its citizens. In some sense, it was taken as an article of faith by the SED 
that the public did not in fact exist without it. Harkening back to Glaeser’s discussion of 
theodicidy in the East German government, we can begin to understand the implications of a 
political party whose essential theoretical armature was built from a veritably metaphysical 
model.  And, as Alan Nothngale has argued, what was at stake in the SED’s every action and 
pronouncement was the very formation of the “Party” as not only the natural and incontestable 
representative of “the worker’s state,” but as a kind of apotheosis of that state, one that gave rise 
to and permitted the East German polity to function in the first place.  
It was with a particular brand of ideological conditioning—in a sort of expedient reversal 
of historical cause and effect—that the SED aligned itself with its citizenry: the idea and practice 
of Parteilichkeit. Parteilichkeit (translated in the dual sense of partisanship and commitment) 
requires that all political, social, cultural and economic questions be analyzed from the lens of 
the inexorable—and in East Germany, always already accomplished—historical triumph of the 
working class.
73
 This thinking meant that the SED was theoretically indivisible from the 
worker’s state—but even more, the Party, irrationally, served as both cause and effect of state 
socialism.  By the logic of the SED’s professed antifas legacy, and the “historically grounded” 
version of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy that pre-ordained culminant state socialism in East 
Germany, the “Party” (the SED, the one and only) was in fact anterior to and representative of 
the working class itself.  
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As Glaeser notes, a curious inversion of the socialism “base-superstructure” model 
occurred in the GDR. Although Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy insisted that the attainment of the 
material conditions of socialism in East Germany would have ensured the ideological rectitude 
of its citizens, considerable and constant ideological “conditioning” was deemed necessary by 
the Party. This imperative was explicitly spelled out in a 1986 program of the SED: 
Marxism-Leninism, in the unity of its parts, is the theoretical foundation for all actions of 
the party. Only on the basis of generally valid scientific theory and its further creative 
development, is it possible to fight the revolutionary battle for the interests of the 
working class. The Socialist Unity Party provides direction and aim for the conscious, 
planned activity of the working people; it consolidates and strengthens socialist class 
consciousness.
74
 
 
The SED clearly understood that irrespective of the manner in which it represented GDR 
socialism to the East German public—that is, as an established, objective fact—the actual 
practice and administration of the socialist state was another matter entirely.  In fact, it was the 
responsibility of the SED to “provide direction and aim for the conscious, planned activity of 
working people.” The question arises, however, why any direction giving was necessary at all. 
Marxism-Leninism’s “generally valid scientific theory” functioned to its authors as a predictive 
model, as a theoretical complement to objectively, empirically observed historical processes that 
would invariably lead to working class emancipation and socialism. In light of these “facts” what 
need did the SED have for ideological conditioning? The answer cuts right to the heart of the 
defining paradox of GDR socialism itself: that which was determined to have been historically 
achieved—namely the socialist state—before its political, social, cultural or economic practice, 
would always need to be enforced and protected from the dialectical residue—that bourgeois 
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inertia—of the historical conditions that preceded it. This may seem too arcane, too academic a 
concern to have had any real impact on the administration of the East German state; but in the 
case of the GDR, the tension between theoretical and historical certainty, and the contingent and 
always potentially destabilized reality of socialism “on the ground” was one that, I would argue, 
functioned to constantly delegitimize the state, and ultimately led to its demise.  
 If the East German body politic constituted a public, if it had an aggregate identity that 
was able to demonstrate a coherent “voice,” Party orthodoxy would have dictated that voice only 
be legitimately exercised through a kind of ventriloquism. Any deviation from Partielichkeit, 
expressions of the imperfections and frictions, resistance and dissent, that characterized “real, 
existing socialism” in the GDR amounted, in the Party’s conception, to grist for the mill of 
dialectical historical development; and any disruptions in the execution of Party planning were 
not the fault of the Party—as the Party simply operated at the behest of ineluctable historical 
will—but were the work of scheming interlopers from the capitalist West that sought to see 
history thwarted.
75
  Within the realm of politics, social theory and even historiography in the 
GDR, intellectual work was always intended to give credence to what was putatively always 
already evident—the triumphant fact of the socialist state itself.  
Much like the feudal understanding of the lord’s identity res publica—that is, only the 
nobility having access to a fully elaborated public body—the socialist “public” in the GDR was 
the only official and ideologically acceptable instantiation of the East German citizenry. The 
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legal status applied to the nobility in Germanic feudal society, res publica, designated the lord 
and the lord alone with an identity that could be represented and reproduced in public. 
Commoners and peasants—those subordinated to the head of the feudal estate—had no recourse 
to public identity, could not, in the modern sense of civic action, publically represent their 
interests.
76
 In a move that—much as Marx did to Hegel—recapitulated and stood an inherited 
social order “on its head,” the GDR gentrified the working class. But this ennobling of the 
proletariat functioned solely on the theoretical level. The absolute elaboration of a “noble public” 
was the ideal of East German socialism, but it did not often find practical application. In concert 
with the Party’s adherence to the inviolable “truth” of Marxist doctrine, “publicness” as an 
objective condition embedded in the teleological process of socio-historical development took on 
the paradoxical quality of something  always present but temporarily concealed.  
Private life—though its demands were, under the  pressure of “real and existing 
socialism,” conceded to more and more throughout the GDR’s history—was, on vulgar, doctrinal 
level an inimical sphere of social existence. The GDR public sphere was ideally—but also 
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practically, insofar as Party dogma permitted no space between theory and practice—to expand 
to a critical mass that was not only self-fulfilling (if history was inexorable, so was, ultimately, 
the will of the Party), but functioned to displace the private sphere in its entirety. It was through 
the public and the public alone that citizens of the GDR accrued their identity, their dignity, their 
legal standing—the notion of the private citizen was neither valorized nor vouchsafed in the 
GDR; only the individual who, by adhering strictly to Party orthodoxy, to Partielichkeit, 
participated in the public ideal deserved the emoluments of East German citizenship.
77
 
 The irony of the GDR as a state founded on the simultaneous theoretical foreclosure of 
the private and the maximal elaboration of an ideal public originated in the persistent 
incompatibility between  socialist ideology and practice: namely that the socialist public in East 
Germany was conceived by the Party a priori, and was considered to proceed undeviatingly, and 
univocally, from the apparatus of the state that constructed itself as already having attained the 
socialist ideal by the very utterance of that attainment. How else explain the tactic of policy 
justification and the demonstration of the “proof” GDR socialism’s nobility and success by 
reference to newspaper propaganda and political speeches? How else explain the massive 
network of secret policing and compelled denunciation of the “private” lives of East German 
citizens who were, theoretically (that is to say, officially) to have achieved class consciousness 
and hence no longer be in need of indoctrination? How else explain the absolute and willful 
negligence the SED displayed in failing to disclose the 1980 labor agreement with Vietnam to 
East German citizens? Officially, as state socialism was a matter of incontestable historical 
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entelechy (the fact of the GDR’s existence being proof of socialism’s historical victory), 
Vietnamese labor could exist in the GDR only as a matter of socialist fraternity. How else 
explain a constitutionally guaranteed process of public participation, Eingabe, that was not 
intended as vehicle for discussion emanating from—or on the subject of—any traditional liberal 
conception of a coherent GDR public sphere?  
As Mary Fullbrook has noted, the structure of the Eingabe process was one that ensured 
maximal atomization (even privatization) of any potentially public expression of discontent. 
Eingaben functioned as “complaints that were constrained to address individual issues that could 
in principle be rectified without querying the deeper systemic roots.”78 In theory, Vietnamese 
Vertagsarbeiter had access to this same channel of expression available to East German citizens. 
If a Vietnamese worker experienced some legal or bureaucratic trouble in the GDR, the 
Eingaben should have been a tool at his or her disposal. It was often difficult, however, for 
foreigners in the GDR to avail themselves of this petitionary right. Eingaben were constructed as 
an avenue for GDR citizens to lodge complaints against government policy on both the local and 
state level. Insofar as they were contractually guaranteed the same rights (and concomitant 
“obligations”) as native East Germans, Vietnamese contract workers also had the right to 
Eingaben. Although it is certainly the case that the Vietnamese availed themselves of their right 
to petition less than their East German counterparts, examples of Vietnamese expressing 
confusion and discontent concerning what they perceived to be unwarranted punishments for 
contractually proscribed actions—which, in some cases meant deportation—do exist.79 
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2.2 Eingaben 
In April of 1986, a female contract worker named Phan (last name redacted) employed at 
Leipzig-Polygraph sent an Eingaben to the office of Herr Eric Honecker.  Phan had lately been 
accused of price speculation. Judging from her account of the prosecution, one assumes it was a 
summary verdict: 
 Sadly, I did not know the policy of the GDR. So I sold sometime in October of November 
of 1984 a musical instrument worth 2,000 Marks for 10,000 Marks. On 3/8/1985 I 
received a communication from the Leipzig customs administration. Before this 
communication arrived, I had learned I had broken a GDR regulation, I was sincerely 
willing to clear up the matter with the Customs Administration, but I had already sold the 
item. So on 4/23/1985 I paid the high penalty of 500 Marks. On 9/19/1985, I received a 
decision from our [SRV] Embassy: “Return to Vietnam for an infraction against a 
regulation of a friendly party. ”80 
 
 Unfortunately for Phan, this kind of investment return ran contrary to the GDR/SRV 
agreement's allowance for the purchase of consumer goods while under contract with East 
German companies. Vietnamese workers were permitted to send back to Vietnam commodities 
purchased in the GDR and that policy was stipulated at the behest of the Vietnamese 
government. While the SED and the Stasi expressed discontent at the Vietnamese treating their 
time in the GDR as “supply missions,” the SRV took advantage of its emigrants' acquisitiveness: 
ignoring SED protests, in 1988 the Vietnamese government dropped all import and custom levies 
on goods sent back to Vietnam, citing the remission as a “strategic aspect of foreign trade.”81 
  Stasi records indicate that, while not engaging in the more outwardly “anti-social” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Germans. This was due in part to lack of follow through on the part of GDR companies, as the demand for unskilled 
labor in the effort to meet high production quotas made the SED's ceaselessly professed goal of “training and 
education” impractical. The Vietnamese, however, organized relatively insular communities around their work and 
barracks lives, and because of this did not generally find the language barrier to be a disadvantage—unless, of 
course, they had inadvertently broken a regulation their lack of German prevented them from knowing existed. For a 
discussion of Vietnamese “ethnic networks and support structures” before and after the Wende, see Karin Weiss, 
“Strukturen der Selbsthilfe im ethnischen Netzwerk,” in Erfolg in der Nische?: Die Vietnamesen in der DDR un in 
Ostdeutschland, eds., Karin Weiss and Mike Dennis (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), 140-144. 
80
 BA Berlin Aktenband 54087/6809, Eingabe; reproduced in Oliver Raendchen, Vietnamesen in der DDR, 91. 
81
 See Damian Mac Con Uladh, “Guests of the Socialist Nation?,” 125. 
54 
 
behavior witnessed in, for example, Polish or Algerian contract workers—bar fights, dalliances 
with East German women, etc.—the Vietnamese were notoriously uninterested in ideological 
edification, and seemed to bring their considerable industry to bear mostly on the accumulation of 
money and goods. Their barracks doubled as warehouses for storage of merchandise to be either 
re-sold or sent home, and extracurricular enterprises like clothing production (of blue jeans 
especially) for sale to East Germans was quite common.
82
 These deviations from contractually 
prescribed behavior were tolerated up to a point; clothing in particular was in high demand by 
GDR citizens in the 1980s, as access to FRG and Western media in general became less regulated 
and images of capitalist couture beckoned. Considering that GDR industry was failing to meet its 
production quotas for basic (and to the younger generation of East Germans, mundane) clothing 
and goods, turning a blind eye to Vietnamese cottage industry was sound policy. Honecker's 
platform, his return to a proper command economy, was predicated on meeting East Germans' 
basic needs—and if the Vietnamese could contribute to that goal, all the better. Currency and 
commodity speculation were another matter, however. 
 It was not uncommon—and it became increasingly more common over the course of the 
1980s as the Vietnamese  developed a kind of para-economic niche in GDR consumer goods—
for contract workers to purchase merchandise at state-run Intershops for resale later in second 
hand An- und Verkauf I (A&V) shops. In this way, ambitious Vietnamese could capitalize on the 
scarcity of certain products on the East German market. For example, in 1985, through an 
elaborate scheme employing borrowed currency and the photo identity cards of former co-
workers who had returned to Vietnam (the Vietnamese were not above taking advantage of the 
fact that many East Germans believed “they all looked alike), a Vietnamese man working in 
Dresden purchased 37 record players in the Intershops for 439 DM a piece, then turned around 
                                                          
82Dennis, “Working under Hammer and Sickle,” 354-347. 
55 
 
sold them at A&V shops for 2,788 DM each.
83
 
 This type of blatant speculative profiteering not only contravened the express purpose of 
Vietnamese commodity accumulation while in East Germany; it also flouted the SED's 
ideological line. And the SED took these infractions seriously. In Phan's case, the punishment 
was ultimately deportation. It is interesting to note that this sentence was not delivered by an 
East German governing body, but by the Vietnamese embassy. The Eingabe itself, however, was 
sent to the very top of the SED; and Phan justified her appeal not only by her persistent good 
faith in the face of being punished for breaking a law she had not known existed, but also on the 
grounds that the SED had the capacity for both reason and clemency, and could potentially 
exercise those faculties to provide her some redress: “During the period while I awaited my 
return to Vietnam, I continued to work, and I worked hard
84
 
 According to Phan's account in the Eingabe, while she continued to work, awaiting her 
deportation, she fell ill with an unspecified throat condition that required minor surgery. Initially, 
the operation was scheduled in January of 1986, but Phan was transferred to a different hospital, 
the Karl Marx University hospital in Leipzig, and the doctor there moved the date of her surgery 
to the 5
th
 of March. Some time before the scheduled operation, she was visited in her barracks by 
“the comrade responsible for overseeing Vietnamese” at the company, Herr Joachim, and was 
told that she could not have the surgery of February 5
th
 , as she was scheduled to return to 
Vietnam on the 17
th
 of that month, and that an operation on the 5
th
 would not allow her enough 
time to convalesce before the trip. “Utterly baffled” at this treatment, Phan was at a loss—it 
seemed that she would not be able to have her operation in the GDR, and she was dismayed at 
the prospect of having to undergo surgery back in Vietnam where “the conditions are not as good 
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as they are here [in the GDR].”85 
 On the 7
th
 of February, 2 days after her surgery was scheduled to have taken place, Phan 
was reexamined by the company physician, who asked her why she had not undergone the 
operation he had scheduled her for. She told him about the forced cancellation of the surgery, and 
her immanent deportation date. This particular physician, however, would not accept 
bureaucratic meddling with his practice. He contacted the company manager—and another 
“comrade” who monitored the Vietnamese at Leipzig-Polygraph, Frau Steinhagen—and 
compelled them to do what was necessary to make sure Phan got her operation before leaving the 
GDR. They obliged, and Phan was re-scheduled to have her surgery on April 28
th
, a little more 
than a week after her assigned deportation date. Relaying this information to Frau Steinhagen, 
Phan was told that she would not have to return to Vietnam before the doctor affirmed that she 
had fully recovered from her operation. Thinking the matter closed, Phan continued to work 
while she waited for her operation date and eventual repatriation to Vietnam. 
 Toward the end of February, however, Phan received a Protocol letter from the barracks 
director (Herr Hung), co-signed by the company manager, that insisted that the matter of her 
status at Leipzig-Polygraph must be concluded by March 7, and that as soon as her health would 
allow it, she must return to Vietnam. On the 12
th
 of March, Phan attended a meeting with the 
company director, the barracks supervisor, a translator, and Frau Steinhagen. At the meeting, 
Frau Steinhagen told Phan that she would have to leave the GDR on the 17
th
 of March, 
completely disregarding the fact that she had herself arranged for Phan to have her operation on 
the 28
th
 of April. This reversal understandably left Phan confused and frustrated: 
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 I was very upset and I didn't understand why Frau Steinhagen changed her opinion from  
 what she had told me at our earlier meeting.  I made the following proposal and offered 
the suggestion that: “I admit that I have made a mistake. I see this and I promise that I 
will not repeat it. I am a foreigner, and had only studied the German Language for two 
months ...You  certainly can understand that I did not know the regulation I violated. I 
declare on my honor that I did not deliberately break any rules.
86
 
  
Phan then continues her defense, now not recounting her appeal to Frau Steinhagen and the 
others, but directly addressing the office of Herr Honecker: 
In the past 4 years I have worked in the GDR. With great dedication I have mastered my 
trade. I have learned many skills from my friends here in the GDR. I love and respect this 
country, and I will not forget it. At the time of my arrival, I was a healthy girl who had 
never been sick. I do not want to return home with an illness. After so many years, I am 
very worried about my mother. Our country is still poor. In the aftermath of the war, 
things are not as good as they are here. Therefore I ask that you review my situation and 
determine if I can be helped, if the operation can be performed here in the GDR. When 
my health is good, I will return to Vietnam.
87
 
 
 The above excerpt closed one (possibly the first) in a series of Eingaben drafted by Phan, 
and dispatched, so the addressee on the petitions would have us believe, directly to Eric 
Honecker. However, surmounting Honecker's name on this first Eingabe is the motto of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Independence, Freedom, Happiness). Official policy for 
Eingaben addressed to Honecker (or, in his time, Ulbricht) was to have them immediately sent 
down to the most relevant local authority.
88
  In the case of Phan's Eingabe, it is safe to assume 
that the letter went through channels in the Vietnamese Embassy before reaching either an 
intermediate destination (that is to say, Honecker's desk) or its final audience: the Precinct 
Council, Labor and Wage Department, Leipzig. 
 In a second Eingabe, Phan laments that she has not yet had her surgery, and that “starting 
on March 3, 1985, [she] will no longer be a member of the company family.” Her situation was 
                                                          
86
 BA Berlin Aktenband 54087/6809, Eingabe; reprinted in Oliver Raendchen, Vietnamesen in der DDR, 93. 
87
Ibid., 93. 
88
 Mary Fullbrook, The People’s State, 271. 
58 
 
further complicated by the fact that she did not have enough money to pay for her flight back to 
Vietnam (evidence that she was attempting to comply with the order, even as she protested it).
89
 
Phan claims that she is still owed part of her salary for 1985, and that if it were paid to her, she 
would use it to pay for travel. This fact is also mentioned—that is to say, simply reported—in the 
Labor and Wage memo dated July of 1986; this memo also notes that Leipzig-Polygraph insists 
that they have compensated Phan in full. Labor and Wage memo makes no recommendation as to 
how to resolve this issue.
90
 
 Some months later, in response to having received to satisfactory results from dealings 
with the Leipzig-Polygraph (and receiving neither aid nor advice from the local government), 
Phan drafted another Eingabe. What is most interesting about this petition is that Phan's tone 
changes from deferential penitence to one more self-possessed, insistent of her right to remain in 
th GDR until she is well enough to travel: 
 During the last meeting with [with the company manger, etc.], I made it clear that I was 
 resolved not to return to Vietnam on the date they insisted I must, and that I would seek 
help from upper management [at Leipzig-Polygraph]. So I came to the conclusion, after a 
few days of contemplation, to write this letter to you, honorable Mr. President.
91
 
 
It is unclear from this letter—their exist in the copy no specific addressee—whether or not 
“Mr. President” refers to Honecker or to a company manager on some level above those with 
whom she had been dealing. In either event, Phan makes very clear her intention to receive the 
treatment she believes to be just: 
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 I would like for you to remember, that my throat ailment is still a problem. I must again 
go to the hospital, because my doctor has stressed that I need to have an operation. The 
hospital has many patients, and it will be some time before I can be fit in. I live now as a 
criminal without work. An outcast from society. My appeals to this point have been 
rejected, and I have been told I do not need to have my operation [in the GDR].
92
 
  
 In yet another moving petition, Phan throws herself on the mercy of the government: 
“Under the circumstances, I appeal to your humanity, because I have been denied everything. I 
see myself as a criminal, as a person outside of the lawful life, outside society.”93 She also 
mentions the precise articles in the GDR statutes that she was being charged in violation of, 
closing her letter with the statement: “I understand that it is necessary to respect these laws.” 
 Unfortunately, as the correspondence under consideration here is not always dated, it is 
impossible to know exactly how much time past between the letter in which Phan branded 
herself a “criminal” and threw herself on the mercy of the state, and the last letter we have record 
of Phan writing.  In this final Eingabe, her distress is slightly mitigated by a small concession 
made by the company: she has been permitted to return to work. The letter is dated April 1, 1986; 
and the last official meeting concerning Phan's operation and deportation took place on the 12
th
 
of March. Suffice it to say, Phan must have been made to experience extreme emotional and 
psychological stress in the time between when she was informed that she would be deported on  
March 17, and the drafting the letter sent on April 1
st
. The question that cannot be answered here 
is whether or not Phan simply disregarded the order that she be on a plane back to Vietnam on 
the 17
th
 of March, or if some deferment was granted that is not noted in the correspondence. In 
either case, Phan was still in the GDR, and still in need of an operation: 
 I will have a healthy and happy future. Again, I am a worker in the company 
 organization. I beg you to help me get the operation for my throat. Also, I ask that you 
 help me reclaim the property  that was confiscated from me by the company on the March 
                                                          
92
 BA Berlin Aktenband 54087/6809, Eingabe; reproduced in Oliver Raendchen, Vietnamesen in der DDR, 94. 
93
 Ibid., 94. 
60 
 
 17. I have spoken with them, and told them that when my health is returned, I will 
 comply with their orders. I heartily thank you in advance for your help. I hope day 
 and night for your humanitarian aid.
94
 
 
 The only record of available correspondence from a government office in consideration 
of Phan's case is a status report (Sachstandbericht) from the Leipzig Department of Labor and 
Wage, dated July 7, 1986 (three months after Phan's last letter). The Labor and Wage Department  
was, to be sure, a far cry from the office the GDR president; and it is not outside the realm of 
possibility that Phan was unaware that she was  making her appeals to this particular department. 
As the status report appears to have been generated for internal use, it cannot be said with any 
certainty that Phan received any communication in response to her Eingaben. 
 As far as Labor and Wages interest in the situation is concerned, their status report goes 
as far as to enumerate the complaints Phan made in her several Eingaben; but there is very little 
comment on the merit of her appeals. The report is of the opinion  that the she had missed three 
surgery appointments due to her own negligence; but the three surgery dates cited  in the report 
do not correspond to those claimed by Phan in her Eingaben. Whether this is attributable to 
Labor and Wage having a source in addition to Phan's appeal (which they certainly must have), 
or negligence and inattention to detail on their part can only left to conjecture. Either way, the 
official “opinion” of Phan's predicament appears to have been that whatever treatment she 
received from her employer (not to mention the Vietnamese embassy) was probably justified. It 
is interesting to note the Precinct's seeming refusal to make any substantive recommendations 
regarding how to address  Phan's situation. No further investigation is suggested; and no advice 
or direction on how to proceed is offered. There are disclosed in the report, however, a few facts 
about Phan's case that her Eingaben did not reveal. 
 It appears that in the three months since she last wrote, Phan had gone on the lam. Not 
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having been able to have her surgery, according to the status report, she left Leipzig in early 
March. This information does not correspond with her April 1
st
 letter, which claims that she had 
begun working again for the company.  Whatever the truth of the matter was, the Labor and 
Wage believed that Phan was back at Leipzig-Polygraph by May; and upon her return she sought 
yet another mediation with the company manger. As with every other attempt that Phan had 
made to resolve her situation by protocol, no ground was gained. Phan left Leipzig again in late 
May, and as writing of the status report (July of '86) she was still somewhere in the GDR, though 
living “without residency permit.”95 
 As stated above, this “official” account of Phan’s transgressions and ultimate 
disappearance into from Leipzig is recorded in a dry, almost ambivalent tone. To read “against 
the grain” of the archival material would, in this instance, lead one to speculate that local 
officials (at least those in the employ of Labor and Wage) did not have the resources to 
effectively deal with contract worker insubordination. Taking a larger view, it seems likely that 
in1986, the sheer number of Vietnamese in the GDR made the task of their administration and 
surveillance almost Sisyphean. 
96
Even the Stasi, whose sole purpose was to monitor and 
intervene on ideologically disruptive behavior could not keep track—or at least could not 
effectively police—general Vietnamese insubordination, not to mention black market activity.  
 In a report generated in 1988 concerning “recommendations for the political and 
ideological security of the Vietnamese workforce in the GDR,” the Stasi does its best to piece 
together and then advise how to combat a black market operation that smuggled “computer and 
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other technical goods” into the GDR. Apparently, several Vietnamese workers—with the aid of 
some “anti-social” elements among the GDR population, an accomplice from an “African state,” 
and, potentially, some help from within the Vietnamese embassy—were not only bringing these 
technologies in from West Berlin, but were also selling them out of their barracks at a 
tremendous mark up. Moreover, they were using false personal identification cards in their 
operation.  Identity fraud, it seems, had become an increasing trend among Vietnamese workers: 
“Compared to 1986, investigative work done in concert with the Vietnamese embassy indicates 
that in 1987, there have been five times the number of cases of Vietnamese citizens abusing their 
identification documents.”97 The Stasi attempted to keep track of this criminal activity, but as the 
Vietnamese seemed to have formed well organized and tightly knit networks for supply and sale 
of contraband, attempts to control the smuggling of goods and the trade in counterfeit ID cards 
were often unsuccessful. As the report in question states: “There appears to be a highly 
developed level of organization, strict labor division, and collaboration among the criminal 
groups. In addition, the individual members are well aware of the high profits that speculation on 
black market goods can yield.”98 
 It must not be assumed, however, that either the above Stasi report or Labor and Wage’s 
assessment of Phan’s Eingaben accurately reflect, or are in anyway representative, of the 
majority of the Vietnamese living and working in the GDR. These documents are useful to this 
discussion insofar as they point to incidences of insubordination, appeal and protest from 
Vietnamese vis-à-vis the East German government (on the state and local levels) that can, in a 
society whose “public sphere” is tightly circumscribed, be construed as the exercise of agency; 
and can even be understood as in a way “participatory” in the East German state despite the 
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restrictions imposed by the state itself. In Phan’s case, her insubordination—at least as it is 
determined to by Leipzig-Polygraph and the city Precinct—was in fact a fierce resolution to 
remain in the GDR regardless of what the GDR had to say about her legal status. Labor and 
Wage came to exactly that conclusion at the end of their report, summing up Phan’s situation by 
stating: “Colleague Phan’s behavior expresses that she does not intend to leave the GDR before 
the legally scheduled termination of her work contract.”99  
 Regardless of her apologetic tone and acknowledgement of guilt (if only through 
ignorance), Phan implicitly draws out a more fundamental injustice perpetrated by the East 
German state. If she is to be punished by deportation, she will not allow that punishment to be 
executed until she is granted what she is contractually guaranteed: the opportunity to avail 
herself of the right to healthcare that she, as did every citizen of the GRD, had legally extended 
to her. It is interesting at this point to note that Phan must have had enough familiarity with the 
German language to have read and understood the article in the 1980 agreement that provided for 
this particular right; but, the veracity plea of ignorance notwithstanding, in asserting her claim to 
that right, and by pursuing the one official channel, that of Eingaben, by which the perceived 
alienation of that right could be appealed, Phan acceded to the East German public body, to the 
extent that such a entity functioned in the GDR.  
 Whether or not Phan’s “insubordination”—her refusal to leave the GDR before her 
time—can be read as, paradoxically, a further elaboration of public participation is not a question 
that can be treated sufficiently here. And while it is hazardous to draw general conclusions from 
specific cases, the very reserve with which Labor and Wage in Leipzig—and the Stasi, for that 
matter—seemed to engage cases like Phan’s indicates a resignation toward certain 
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transgressions,  possibly even bordering on tolerance. And it is not irresponsible conjecture that 
this “tolerance” was guided by these agencies recognizing that the Vietnamese labor force had 
become indispensible to the GDR economy. 
 Simply put, these state organizations charged with policing the Vietnamese could not 
have, on some level, effectively discharged their official duties, because the duties themselves 
ran contrary to the true objectives of the state. Maintenance of ideological propriety and the 
discouragement of black market trade were, in the long view, infinitesimal concerns next to the 
massive structural economic challenges the GDR faced in the l980s. In late1987, the SED 
Economic Planning Commission noted that, even taking into consideration the over 30,000 
Vietnamese workers that had come under contract to the GDR since the beginning of the year, 
production of children’s shoes, jackets and pants was still short; and it was estimated that another 
5,000 worker would be required to meet the quotas.
100
 But this urgent need for labor, as has been 
claimed already in this thesis, could not be admitted to the GDR public for a basic reason: the 
SED was theoretically infallible (Die Partei hat immer recht); without that certainty, the state 
would cease to function. The fact that it could not be officially admitted, however, does not mean 
that reality of the situation did not influence the “practice” of socialism in the day to day. And as 
Eingaben like Phan’s seem to suggest, those Vietnamese integral to propping up the GDR in its 
last decade did not function entirely as “machines” without agency; nor did those agencies that 
administered the diurnal state expect them to. 
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5   NOT SAYING WHAT CANNOT BE SAID: SOCIALISM AS RITUAL   
PERFORMANCE                    
This chapter takes up the problem of willful elision in not only SED rhetoric proper, but in the 
GDR’s popular press.  I argue that the calculated absence of information regarding the economic 
factors that brought tens of thousands of Vietnamese to East Germany over the course of the 
1980s was a rhetorical strategy the SED employed that functioned on two levels: first, and most 
obviously, to simply not mention economic trouble at the very least deferred the moment when it 
had to be publically faced; second, and more subtlety, the endless repetition of Party nostrums 
functioned to displace the actual “real and existing” GDR socialism with a kind of “rhetorical 
real.” The SED granted this rhetorical reality primacy over the always imperfect diurnal 
socialism, and used it as a kind of buffer—underwritten, always, by the “objective” conditions of 
history that only socialism could apprehend—against any criticism of the state.  
This strategy could not, of course, ultimately contain the realities of the either the East 
German economy or building social anomie—whether or not these phenomena are coextensive 
cannot be answered here—and as I will show in this last chapter, the incessant pronouncements 
of socialist fraternity in the pages of popular publications like Neues Deutschland speak to the 
careful reader of the unstable ground under the SED’s rhetorical gambit. The few examples from 
Neues Deutschland that appear below not only give evidence to this assertion, but also disclose a 
peculiar formal, ritualized structure to SED’s engagement with the East German populace. To 
decipher this structure, we will turn again to Roy Rappaport, and his discussion of the 
performative nature of liturgy. 
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5.1 Neues Deutschland on Vietnam: Internationalism in Black and White 
 On April 26, 1980, a headline in the East German newspaper Neues Deutschland 
announced: “GDR and Vietnam Work in Closer Cooperation.”101  In light of the inter-
governmental labor agreement signed just two weeks earlier, this article in takes on a special 
significance.  It does not address the scope of the agreement with Vietnam, that would, by 1989, 
bring over seventy-thousand Vietnamese workers to East Germany.  In fact, the article makes no 
specific mention of the labor agreement at all.  Instead, Neues Deutschland emphasizes the 
general spirit of “brotherly friendship and effective collaboration between the [GDR and 
Vietnam],” claiming that the two governments have in the recent past (no specific date is given) 
jointly singed a “protocol” issuing from a conference on economic cooperation.102  Only 
tangentially does the article note Vietnamese working in East Germany, and this in the context of 
an SRV politburo representative expressing thanks for “training of Vietnamese citizens as skilled 
laborers in the GDR.”103 
A survey of Neues Deutschland’s reportage on GDR relations with Vietnam during April 
of 1980—the month that East Germany signed a labor contract of vast political and economic 
significance with the Southeast Asian state—demonstrates to what extent the SED’s public 
rhetoric subordinated the basic facts of its foreign policy to its ideological mission.  In addition 
to the article discussed above several articles over the course of the month of April discuss in 
very general terms the climate of “friendship and cooperation” being fostered by GDR delegates 
in Vietnam; but this author could not find a single item addressing the signing of an official 
                                                          
101
 “DDR und Vietnam wirken in enger Kooperation,” Neues Deutschland, 26/27 April 1980, 6. 
102
  Ibid., 6. 
103
  Ibid., 6. 
67 
 
treaty which guaranteed a drastic increase of Vietnamese employment within the borders of the 
GDR.   
An item concerning GDR relations with Vietnam in the April 12/13 edition of Neues 
Deutschland further serves to illustrate the SED’s ideological agenda, while mentioning nothing 
about the labor agreement.  Reporting on an FDJ (Free German Youth Movement) delegation 
visiting the Vietnamese city of Vihn, the article discusses how the delegates were welcomed to 
the city, the birthplace of the Vietnamese worker’s movement that is now, with the help of the 
GDR “reemerging…after being utterly destroyed by the US airforce during the war of American 
aggression.”104  The highpoint of the delegation’s visit was a “meeting convened by the FDJ to 
form friendship 500 members of the Communist Youth League of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh.”  It is 
also reported that the secretary of the Communist Youth League “thanked the FDJ for its support 
and solidarity.”105  
Here we see two strategies that typify the internationalist rhetoric of the SED.  First, the 
GDR delegates are represented as aligning themselves with the Vietnamese struggle against 
capitalist imperialism (celebrating the “reemergence of a city destroyed by American 
aggression”), cementing their commitment to the socialist mission; and second, the paper’s 
depiction of the FDJ representatives addressing the Ho Chi Minh organization in a “meeting to 
build friendship,” inscribes the East Germans as paternalistic educators (bilden, the verb 
employed in the article, means to “build” and to “educate”).  To further sculpt the GDR 
representatives as model vessels of anti-imperialist socialism, Neues Deutschland notes that the 
secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Youth League “thanked the FDJ for its support and 
                                                          
104
 “Delgation der FDJ besuchte das wiederentstehende Vihn,” Neues Deutschland, 12/13 April 1980, 1. 
105
  Ibid., p. 6. 
68 
 
solidarity.”  The power dynamic in this discourse is implicit; and the image of GDR 
functionaries approaching their fledgling Vietnamese “bothers in socialism” with pedantic 
magnanimity and internationalist compassion occurs again and again in the pages of Neues 
Deutschland.   
What is most important in this connection, however, is that this image of benevolent 
internationalism plied by the SED in Neues Deutschland was primarily meant for the 
consumption of the East German public.  It was to the citizens of East Germany that the GDR 
government meant to represent itself in a glowing paternalistic light.  And this effort of 
ideologically funded self-aggrandizement served a purpose beyond mere vanity.  For example, 
on April 23, Neues Deutschland reports that 
A conference for the committees for economic and scientific cooperation between the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the GDR has commenced in Hanoi…The meeting 
began with the leaders of both delegations stating that the SED Central Committee’s 
General Secretary and the President of the GDR,  Erich Honecker, met with the General 
Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1975 an 1977 concerning agreements 
about economic cooperation and the successful realization of GDR solidarity and support 
for Vietnam.
106
 
 
 Here we have what amounts to the minutes of a high level cabinet meeting, a kind of 
mirage of transparency by which the SED allows the East German citizen to think that he or she 
has access to the machinery of the state.  And again, the GDR’s continued support for and 
solidarity with Vietnam in the struggle for political and economic improvement is on display.  
But what is most interesting is that this dry reportage, which acknowledges some measure of 
cooperation between the GDR and Vietnam, completely fails to mention that a very specific and 
extensive labor was signed less than two weeks prior to the appearance of this article.  This being 
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so, one is compelled to wonder why agreements (vaguely described as “economic and scientific 
cooperation”) that were made in the 1975 and 1977 respectively are the only ones Neues 
Deustschland mentions.  Insofar as Neues Deutschland was the primary news organ of the SED, 
one cannot help but infer that the vague, ideologically freighted rhetoric that the paper employed 
was typical of the GDR government’s communication with its citizens; but what is being 
obscured, what is elided by the absence of information on the April 11 contract with Vietnam in 
the official press, was that, by 1980, foreign labor had become utterly essential to the survival of 
the East German economy.   
 The formulaic, almost ritualized, and most certainly repressive nature of Neues 
Deutschland reportage was brought into starker relief by the fact that GDR economic and trade 
relationships with countries other than Vietnam were written about in almost identical terms—
sometimes within the same article. In the piece discussed above, “workforce cooperation” with 
Hungary is discussed alongside (in fact, prior to) the report on GDR-Vietnamese relations. And 
the template for reporting on these “cooperative economic arrangements” proves the same, 
regardless of which country is being addressed:  
The president of the Peoples Republic of Hungary, György Lázár, received on Tuesday 
the Deputy of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, Wolfgang Rauchfuß. Rauchfuß 
visited Hungary as a representative of GDR delegation for the GDR/Hungary 
commission on technical and economic cooperation.
107
 
 
After having dispensed with the obligatory litany of party officials and their honorifics—not to 
mention the invariant and incantatory mention of vague “commissions” in furtherance of 
economic cooperation—the item gets down to the business of “details” : 
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Joined by representative of the Chief Minister, Jozsef Marjai, the council discussed the 
status of the realization of the March 1977 meeting concerning the party and government 
delegations of both countries and their assessment of the methods for the effective 
implementation for further cooperation. During the council meeting, questions were 
posed concerning economic and technological cooperation during the period of 1985-
1989 and the continuing realization of supply deliveries in accordance with the 1980 
protocol.
108
 
  
The apparent goal of complete obfuscation vis-à-vis any substantive reporting on the 
“objective” of these international meetings and agreements (not to mention evasion of any 
discussion of the success or failure of the later) is in fact a bone fide rhetorical strategy for SED’s 
daily news organ. And there is no variation of this strategy relative to the particular 
“international cooperative agreement” under consideration. One could simply replace the names 
of Hungarian council members with those of their Vietnamese counterparts, move the location 
from Budapest to Hanoi (as is actually done in this article) and message would be exactly the 
same: The GDR engages in diplomatic relationships with lesser socialist nations out of its benign 
sense of duty and avuncular charity.  Both sections of the article make conspicuous mention of 
the GDR’s economic support for its socialist brothers. As far is Hungary is concerned, it is made 
clear in the one specific detail of the council meeting mentioned in the article that the question of 
“supplies” delivered by the GDR to Hungary was raised, and that the GDR planned to continue it 
altruism along those lines; with the Vietnamese, charitable donations amounted—in addition to 
economic cooperation—to gestures of solidarity and ideological support. That said, if the 
identical structure of these “news items” is worth noting in its own right, it is even more 
remarkable taking into consideration how disingenuous claims to “ideological and economic 
support” for Vietnam read now, in retrospective light of the 1980 labor agreements. 
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As ND articles discussed above seem to indicate, the SED’s paternalist rhetoric of 
internationalist cooperation with Vietnam may have provided a kind of stock explanation for the 
increasing visibility of Vietnamese laborers the in the GDR.  Prior to the 1980s, Vietnamese 
workers who came to the East Germany were represented by official propaganda as partners in 
labor cooperation; and before the labor agreements, this depiction had some legitimacy.
109
 As an 
article from September of 1978 announces, “With Vietnam We Are Bound as Brothers”: 
Right now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam needs the help of and support and solidarity 
of its brother countries, of the socialist collective around the world. The GDR has a long 
tradition of supporting its Vietnamese brothers. In the years of criminal U.S. aggression, 
and since the beginnings of socialism in Vietnam the citizens of our socialist fatherland 
have fulfilled their duties toward their Vietnamese brothers. 
110
 
 
This claim of East German dedication to the North Vietnamese cause during its conflict with the 
United States is not a hollow one. In fact, the GDR contributed much more than “ideological” 
support to the North Vietnamese during the war, sending shipments of arms and other material 
aid packages to Vietnam in the name of anti-imperialist fraternity.
111
As Horst Sinderman, chair 
of the GDR People’s Chamber avowed to Vietnamese delegates in 1973: “You have inflicted a 
defeat on USA imperialism, the same USA imperialism which is just a few kilometers from 
us.”112 With the 1980 agreement, however, the GDR’s relationship with its Vietnamese brothers 
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took on much more exploitative dimensions; and the terms of that agreement made it clear that 
labor was of higher priority than solidarity.
113
   
Regardless of the economic realities in the GDR in 1980s, the general drift of SED 
rhetoric geared toward the East German public (as in evidence by the articles considered earlier) 
continued to represent GDR agreements and economic arrangements with other socialist states as 
measures of socialist cooperation.  In truth, dire economic circumstances are a much more 
plausible explanation for the GDR’s accelerated importation of labor after 1980.114And part of 
what drove the downturn in the East German economy (after larger indicators like having deeply 
leveraged itself to the FRG after 1972, and price spikes in Soviet raw material in the 70s and 
80s)
115
 was an increasingly mismanaged and torpid native East German labor force. Under the 
Honecker regime, renewed emphasis on direct economic steering encouraged businesses to 
enhance manpower instead of investing in labor-saving technology; and the Eight Congress’s 
principle task (Hauptaufgabe) to ramp up production at the expense of long term capital 
investment, left employers in need of an expanded labor force, the likes of which the East 
German population could not provide on its own.
116
In comparative terms, prior to the 
programmatic importation of Vietnamese labor beginning in the 80s, overall production in the 
GDR was ran at roughly half the output of the FRG.
117
 
This grim economic facts being so, what Neues Deutschland saw fit to print about GDR 
relations with Vietnam notwithstanding, by the 1980s, Vietnamese contract labor programs were 
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entirely geared toward filling production gaps in the East Germany’s planned economy.  The 
training and education initiatives of the ‘60s and ‘70s were supplanted by the demand for raw 
labor. This is borne out by the type of employment that the Vietnamese found themselves in 
upon reaching the GDR; their work was often in undesirable, low-skilled positions, “i.e. the kind 
that Germans did not what to take on.”118  Moreover, in addition to being placed in the most 
“dirty and dangerous work,” in GDR factories, not even the pretence of integration into the East 
German populations was made by the SED. In addition to GDR company’s recourse to summary 
dismissal of Vietnamese employees in the event of broadly defined “insubordination,” and 
prohibitions on marriage and pregnancy (as discussed in Chapter Three), the very fact that labor 
contracts were to last no longer than five years indicated that the GDR has no interest in the 
Vietnamese becoming full members of East German society.
119
 
The glaring schism between the SED’s rhetoric of “internationalist solidarity” and the 
actual drive toward and implementation of labor contracts with Vietnam did not fail to produce 
negative consequences in the daily lives of the Vietnamese and native East Germans.  The fact 
that the East German public seems to have been calculatedly uninformed about the rising 
importation of labor in the 1980s speaks directly to the embattled state of SED ideology and 
practice.  Moreover, the intended panacea of SED rhetoric not only failed to mitigate, but 
actually exacerbated the tension between the Vietnamese workers and the native East German 
population. In the absence of any complete explanation of Vietnamese working and living among 
them, and with economic conditions steadily worsening as the 1980s drew to a close, East 
Germans began to perceive contract workers from Vietnam as not only a cultural but a material 
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threat. The pompous and hollow proclamations that the SED made about its mission of socialist 
fraternity did nothing to mitigate this growing tension.
120
 
While invocations of internationalism were stock in trade for SED “public relations,” the 
true objective of the labor contract with Vietnam was implicit even in preliminary negotiations 
with Vietnam concerning the articles of the 1980 contract. In response to a March 1980 
Vietnamese proposal that new workers immigrating under the aegis of the new agreement be 
placed in companies in which Vietnamese skilled laborers already worked (possibly to 
ameliorate the cultural shock of the latest cohort), the SED flatly demurs.  The justification for 
this refusal is a vague reference to the “structure of the GDR workforce” being incompatible 
with such a request; but the subtext in the negotiation is clear: Vietnamese workers are no longer 
considered the “beneficiaries” of GDR socialism’s goodwill, they are being recruited to work, 
and to work alone.
121
 
Compare this more realistic assessment of the labor contract goals to an article printed in 
Neues Deutschland in November of 1980 entitled: “The GDR and Vietnam Conclude a Long-
Term Agreement.” In light of what we now know about the 1980 agreement with Vietnam, the 
title of this article would lead one to assume that what would be covered therein would be the 
details of an expansive and unprecedented labor contract. But one would be wrong in that 
assumption. As I have said many times over the course of this thesis, not only did the SED refuse 
to explain the scope and impetus of the agreement with Vietnam, it failed to talk specifically 
about the agreement at all. What the article does say is that GDR and Vietnam Foreign Trade 
Ministers signed an agreement in Hanoi that would “further economic cooperation between 1981 
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and 1986.” This agreement, however, only considers trade between the two countries (couched in 
the seemingly pure altruism of the GDR): “The GDR will in the coming year supply technical 
equipment for the production of export goods in the SRV. It will also supply materials for the 
production of automobiles, pesticides and equipment for mining operations and medical 
practice.” The SRV, on the other hand, will continue to supply in trade the “traditional 
commodities” (that is to say: “primitive”) that they have offered in the past: coffee, tea, spices 
and fruit. There is the expectation of the further development of textile manufacture in Vietnam’s 
future; but that development is, of course, riding on the assistance of the GDR.
122
 
The general and reductive reportage in SED party organs like Neues Deutschland created 
a climate where GDR citizens new almost nothing about the real reason Vietnamese men and 
women were working among them.
123
  It must be noted, however, that while the SED’s apparent 
refusal to address the economic necessity of foreign labor in the state press (compounded by the 
fact that the labor agreement itself indirectly stipulated that integrations was not intended), the 
Vietnamese themselves also contributed to their relative invisibility in the GDR; their social lives 
were most often centered on their own expatriate communities, which formed cohesive and 
largely self-sufficient hostel based support networks.
124
 In the end, it was the SED’s treatment of 
Vietnamese laborers—utterly at odds with its official rhetoric—that was most to blame for their 
anonymity.  The question that remains is to what extent this relative anonymity functioned to 
either inhibit or abet the agency of Vietnamese workers under contract in GDR. As has been 
discussed in the previous chapter, occasions of insubordination and attempts to legally exercise 
personal rights were not unheard of for Vietnamese in the GDR. The disparity between socialist 
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theory and practice in the GDR sometimes meant that their existed space for individuals (East 
Germans and foreign laborers alike) negotiate the prescriptions of the state on their own terms. In 
fact, as I will investigate in the next section of this chapter, the paradoxical edifice of state 
socialism, verging in its theoretical aspect on a kind of irrational temporal disruption as 
justification for its governing legitimacy (the conditions of historical socialism as always already 
present), inadvertently created the conditions for its own subversion. And what is most important 
about this argument it is exactly the extent to which the GDR was not—in conception and 
execution—a totalitarian state that manufactured, a Foucault would have it, “the dense transfers 
of power” that characterized daily life in socialist East Germany.125 
5.2 Whatever Is Said, Is So: The Socialist Liturgy 
To close this chapter, and to return to the theoretical argument broached in Chapter Two, 
I would like to turn again to anthropologist Roy A. Rappaport’s discussion of language and 
ritual. After the examples of repetitive, almost incantatory iterations of heavily ideologically 
freighted phrases (“brotherhood,” “fraternity,” and, as we will see in a moment, “history”) that 
have been offered above in the brief survey of Neues Deutschland reportage, Rappaports’s 
notion of the performative function of liturgy will serve as a useful tool with which to examine 
the curious rhetorical logic of the SED.  
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Rappaport’s argument that ritual is both performative and ahistorical, is especially 
germane to a discussion of the goal of SED rhetoric.  I maintain that SED functioned within the 
parameters of an ideal-theoretical self-conception that worked very much like the formal 
liturgical structures of ritual. Liturgy (and, for the moment, as we are only speaking of formal 
characteristic, the term is used in a universal sense) is a phenomenon that in both theory and 
practice inhabits the realm of the extramundane. It limns a world—a metaphysical territory—that 
is not subject to the ambiguity or potential for deceit of everyday reality. Ritual practice, and the 
space it occupies, creates, sustains and validates a public body, its network of lateral dependency 
and reciprocation, as well as—and maybe most importantly—the legitimacy and stability of its 
leadership. As Rappaport maintains:  
Liturgical acts repeatedly recover the eternal which, being nothing if not immutable, is 
intrinsically true, and thus moral and even proper. The enactments of time out of time 
may account  for or explain the origins and states of historical events and processes, and 
thus provide grounds for understandings of them, but they are not themselves history. 
Indeed, they stand against history and may even propose standards in whose terms the 
events of history are to be judged.
126
 
 
In fact, liturgy as not only ahistorical, but, relative to history’s irascible volatility and 
contingency, it is anti-historical. As such, diurnal reality in relation to the liturgical realm is 
always subordinate phenomenon. Actually, taking to its logical extreme within the context of 
liturgy, material reality is merely a phenomenon-cum-phenomenon—a kind of surface without 
substance. Only that which is antithetical to the contingent everyday world, and hence, 
antithetical to history, can lay claim to an ontological dimension. And only liturgy escapes 
history.  
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 As we’ve seen over the course of this paper, the SED laid claim to what it conceived as 
an historically vouchsafed and inexorable socialist German state. GDR historians would look at 
any event in the German past and read that event of proof in the form of pre-ordainment of the 
triumph of German socialism. But what lingered beneath these pronouncements and 
verifications, these self-fulfilling prophesies putatively grounded in the scientifically derivable 
currents of historical progress, was an inveterately ahistorical— if not anti-historical—
theoretical method.  Take, for example, an article that appeared in Neues Deutschland in May of 
1989 entitled, The History of the Communist International: 
… as Lenin avowed: [the Soviet revolution] stands on the shoulders of the [Paris] 
Commune, so exactly should we treat the history of our Party, the KDP. Hence comrade 
Eric Honecker rightly claimed that we have no difficulty with our history, and we avow 
our past. Participation in this sentiment must be viewed through the eyes and experience 
of the present day. That is entirely natural and correct. Today we are experienced and 
wise in the class struggle. But don’t we need to see in this the totality founded by the 
history of Materialism, Historicism and the present historical situation? Have we 
developed the history of the class struggle strictly through right (or wrong) decisions or 
formulas? 
127
 
 
 The answers to these rhetorical questions are respectively—and definitively—“yes” and 
“no.” East Germans most certainly must see the totality of Materialism and Historicism—the 
seismic but unerring friction of history—in the present conditions of GDR socialism; just as 
much as they must not explain the existence of the present socialist state as the product of 
potentially misguided human agency. History’s only function in the GDR—certainly one 
manifestly political— was to insist a perpetual presentism in the German past. Historical 
Germany (from Luther through Bismark and Hitler, and, finally to Ulbricht and Honecker) 
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always proceeded in the direction of state socialism; and any event in the long and bloody 
corridor that led to GDR was proof of the inevitability of that state before the fact. 
 This kind of thinking, which branded itself as historical, was in fact of the very same 
stripe of extramundane as the timeless and immutable formal structures of ritual.  Historical 
materialism in the GDR justified all present events by recourse to an “indisputable” legacy of 
stalwart German communism that was itself only justified by the present state of East German 
socialism. Where this thinking broke down—or pointing to structural faults deeper than its 
surface cracks of circularity—was that it had to appeal to a transcendental model, to an ideal, to 
support and legitimate itself. But how does one accomplish this historio-theoretical task in a 
system that of necessity repudiates the metaphysical? Just the East German public body was 
supposed to irrationally proceed from an already constituted “publicness” represented by the 
SED, the immanent conditions of “historical” socialism in the GDR were, in effect, reputed to be 
the result of the material incarnation of eternal, ahistorical and transcendent world historical 
processes.
128
For all that Marx purported to stand Hegel on his head, Marxism circled back and 
made of history itself an external principal, a metaphysical prime mover. And, interestingly, this 
prime mover, this historical process that transcended history, had a name: ideology. 
 This notion of ideology as the “externalization” totalization of immanent phenomenon is 
taken up by Slavoj Žižek in his discussion of Marx and Hegel. It is his assertion Marx put 
forward the notion of historical processes (and hence, the process of historical accounting) as: 
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the radically external historical presuppositions of synchronous historical totality, its contingent 
starting point that eludes dialectical grasp, its “missing link” whose exclusion the dialectical 
totality endeavors to fill out by means of a fantasy-scene.”129  This fantasy scene, for GDR 
historians and SED officials, was very much ideological certainty of socialism historical triumph. 
For SED ideology to proceed as a legitimating force in the Party’s claim to authority of East 
German society, the historical “missing link” was discovered in socialism itself—socialism that 
existed before, during and after its embodiment in the GDR; socialism as an eternal principle that 
gave the lie to history conceived as accidental. 
  This same approach is evident in the SED purely ideologically driven public 
representation of relationship with Vietnam. Never in the pages of Neues Deutschland was there 
printed a story that discussed contract labor as product of economic need. The Vietnamese were 
certainly present in the SED’s public rhetoric—in the early 1980s at least, mention of GDR-
Vietnamese “relations” was an almost daily item in the pages of ND)—but they were present as a 
kind of idealized socialist “primitive”; by their very state of infrastructural and ideological 
“underdevelopment” the Vietnamese presented to the GDR proof of its superiority, and the 
superiority of socialism. Because without socialism, and without the GDR as its exemplar, a 
“nation” like Vietnam would languish in ignorance and brutality.  Incessant pronouncements like 
“with Vietnam we are bound as brothers” (and even simple statements to the public like “We 
have entered into cooperation with the SRV) were more than just descriptions of external states; 
they were performative utterances intended to bring those states into being, if only on the 
ideological register.  
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Unfortunately for the Vietnamese who lived and worked in East Germany, these 
pronouncements did not influence the way East Germans treated them, did not make their lives 
any easier as they attempted to negotiate “real and existing” GDR socialism. And as the days of 
the GDR drew to a close, the manner in which the SED chose to rhetorically structure its real 
relations with real Vietnamese men and women in East Germany would prove to have profound 
and sometimes devastating consequences. 
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 CONCLUSION 
To close the investigation of GDR socialism taken up in this thesis, I would like to turn 
again to Roy Rappaport.  His work on ritual and religion offers yet another analogy between 
SED ideology and liturgical practice—in particular, the way in which liturgy constructs and 
functionally inverts the correspondence between beliefs and statements about reality, and 
authentic state of that reality. 
Rappaport discusses a particular extra-liturgical phenomenon in Zoroastrian Persia 
classified as a Vedic (or Zoroastrian lie). In simple terms, a Vedic lie is an occasion of everyday 
reality not corresponding to the prescriptions of the liturgical order: i.e. if something occurs in 
society that the liturgy does not endorse, or if a state of affairs seems to run counter to what the 
liturgy claims, it is the material, everyday reality that is “wrong” or misrepresentative, not the 
content of the liturgy.
130
 It appears fairly clear that a system which confers absolute authority on 
the liturgical reality is virtually coextensive with a political system that insists the absolute 
rectitude of its regnant Party (die Partei hat immer recht), namely, the SED.  
 Rappaport goes on to explain how this incontrovertible liturgical authority actually 
purports to create the “true” reality of the social world. Insofar as ritual practice is 
“performative” (that is to say, it purports to bring into being the states of affairs it pronounces), it 
functions on two levels: on the one hand, a ritual practice that pronounces a state of affairs 
succeeds in creating that state solely by the successful completion of a prescribed liturgical 
utterance; on the other, that state of affairs must be reproduced in actual everyday society by a 
given individuals fidelity to the pronouncement of the liturgy. From the standpoint of the liturgy, 
however, the effect of a given performative act/utterance in the “real world” is a redundant 
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concern. The “real world” is not the world with which the liturgy measures its success or 
failure—liturgical achievements correspond to the metric of ritual prescription alone.131  
 The history of SED and the world that it constructed for the consumption of the East 
German population amounted, on some level, to an extended—and not always unsuccessful—
Vedic lie. The image that was fashioned to explain Vietnamese nationals living and working in 
the GDR—fraternity, internationalist largess, etc.— was very much a reality fabricated and 
ceaselessly pronounced as if its utterance alone would not only disguise the reality it addressed, 
but, in effect, bring a different reality into being. In some true sense, GDR socialism as a 
rhetorical phenomenon appealed to its putative external historical certainty as kind of 
metaphysical collateral for its political, economic and social success; but this appeal demanded 
that the SED subordinate that reality—the struggles and failures—of the diurnal state to the 
rhetorical image it insisted was the reality of that state. The failings of day to day state were the 
lies; socialism was the one and only truth. The Vietnamese, however, suffered for the SED’s 
irrational inversions of cause and effect, of truth and lies. As the state did not communicate to its 
population the structural factors that demanded the presence of foreign labor, East Germans 
began to see the Vietnamese (and other contract labor contingents) as not only competition for 
scarce goods, but as directly responsible for their scarcity. This misperception lead to pent up 
animosity against the Vietnamese, and that animosity found violent outlet with the collapse of 
the state that had served to keep it in check. 
 With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Vietnamese contract workers in the former 
German Democratic Republic found themselves in a precarious position. The dissolution of the 
GDR forced many East German companies to drastically scale back production (if not close 
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down entirely), and massive lay-offs followed apace. And if GDR rhetoric of socialist fraternity 
and equal treatment of workers regardless of national origin proved hollow through the 80s, it 
seemed to have no place at all in country’s final days. In May of 1990, East Germany and 
Vietnam amended the terms of the labor agreement to permit the early termination of work 
contracts at the behest the either the employer or the employee. If early termination was sought 
by either party, the Vietnamese worker was to receive from the company a bonus 3,000 DM, 
severance pay at 70% of their salary, and the cost of a return flight to Vietnam. These 
entitlements were not always met, however, as GDR and former GDR business did everything in 
their power to pay the Vietnamese as little termination compensation as possible (from stalling 
bonus payments so that workers would repatriate before receiving them, to terminating contracts 
earlier than stipulated, and even illegally raising dormitory rents to offset severance pay). 
Moreover, Vietnamese laborers were laid off in much greater numbers than were German 
workers; and in some cases Germans resorted to outright sabotage of their Vietnamese coworkers 
in order to protect their own jobs. In one instance, German workers even threatened to strike 
unless their “foreign” coworkers were fired.132 
 For those Vietnamese workers who were able to keep their jobs—or for those who left 
their employers, but chose to remain in the transitional German state under FRG asylum laws—a 
host of new challenges reared. The confusing and occasionally mercenary treatment Vietnamese 
workers were subjected to in the last days of the GDR were not alleviated after unification. 
Vietnamese who had been laid off or quit jobs in the former East Germany were encouraged to 
return to Vietnam; but as has been mentioned, the money for flights home was rarely 
forthcoming, and in many cases, former contract workers found themselves stranded with no 
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work, and cruelly limited prospects. 
 After unification, the FRG’s expansive asylum law extended to the former East; and its 
protection offered—prima facie—some legal standing for disenfranchised contract workers to 
remain in Germany.  Earning enough money to live in unified Germany—legally or otherwise—
was another matter all together. Vietnamese who had worked for GDR companies were granted 
visas by the German government, but these visas expressly prohibited them working in the 
former FRG.
133
Barred from seeking employment in economically prosperous west, Vietnamese 
were forced to look for work in the aftermath of the East German state, and when this search 
inevitably proved unsatisfactory, they were forced to participate in the black market fringe 
economy that lingered on in the former GDR. This participation in the “fringe economy” 
ultimately translated into the stigma that the Vietnamese were parasites on the German welfare 
system, if not a mortal threat to ethnic Germans by dint of their participation in the illegal 
cigarette trade, and putative organization into “mafia” like cadres.134 
 This structurally determined anomie, however, paled in comparison to the abominable 
treatment some former contract workers received at the hands of disenfranchised former East 
Germans. Right wing extremist groups—running the spectrum from unreconstructed “Germany 
for Germans” nationalism to blatant neo-Nazism—discharged their vitriol on Vietnamese and 
other immigrant populations in the early years of the new republic. Themselves unable to come 
to terms with the dislocation and social ostracism that attended their status as colonized pawns of 
the Soviet behemoth, former East Germans were subject to a crisis of identity not entirely unlike 
that which was suffered by the Vietnamese. Sadly, the Vietnamese became the scapegoats for this 
crisis, and for the depressed economic and social conditions in former East Germany. Foreigners 
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were seen competition for resources and jobs; and in the absence of any concrete object of rage 
and discontent—one cannot lash out at a state that has dissolved, especially a state that had 
insisted that its citizens could feel no discontent—they often became victims of verbal and 
physical attacks.
135
 
 The SED’s responsibility for outbreaks of racist violence in the new Germany cannot be 
ignored. In fact, during the last years of the GDR, a groundswell of xenophobia, if not outright 
racism, began to breach the surface of a society where racial animosity officially did not exist.  
Scarcity of goods in the final days of the GDR was often blamed on the purchasing power of the 
Vietnamese; and the SED did nothing to dispel this thinking. The calculated evasion of the true 
nature of the Vietnamese presence in GDR left native East Germans unaware of the positive role 
that migrant labor played in the economy. But because admitting to the need for Vietnamese 
labor would have been tantamount to the SED putting its own legitimacy in jeopardy, invocation 
of brotherhood and internationalist fraternity stood in for the facts of “real and existing 
socialism.” While the GDR existed, violent reactions to migrant laborers were held in check; but 
when the wall came down, whatever hate had built toward the Vietnamese and other migrant 
populations was unleashed. Misplaced outrage reached its ghastly apex when a neo-Nazi group 
fire-bombed a Vietnamese barracks in Rostock in August of 1992. This attack was the 
culmination of a right-wing extremist riot the raged for almost a week in the economically 
moribund Baltic coastal town.  Almost more reprehensible than the attack on the Vietnamese 
itself, was the fact that neither the local police nor the fire brigade responded to the conflagration 
at the hostel; and the Vietnamese were left to their own devices, forced to escape over burning 
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rooftops as a hate-drunk crowed screamed: “Germany for Germans.”136 
This violence was in large part a direct result of policy decisions of not only the GDR, 
but also the newly unified German state.  Both governments failed to address the rising 
xenophobia in Eastern Germany, before and after the caesura of 1990.  And although the 
alienation felt by Eastern Germans after they were effectively absorbed by their Western 
counterparts—compounded by high unemployment and the continued dearth of material goods—
was certainly a contributing factor to racist treatment of immigrants, it was the post-Wende 
German government’s curiously “hands-off” attitude with regard xenophobia that was 
instrumental in the what became the politicization of anti-foreigner sentiment.  The deliberately 
circumspect and paternalistic attitude of the SED in dealing with the importation of Vietnamese 
labor also contributed to racist violence in Eastern Germany post-1990. And the rhetorical 
strategy employed by the SED as it “explained” its foreign policy to its citizens left former East 
Germans without tools to negotiate the new Germany.
137
 
 In closing, I must insist that the criticisms contained in this thesis are intended neither as 
an indictment of socialism-qua-socialism, or as sweeping dismissal of the history of the GDR as 
a putatively socialist state. The paradox of socialist theory in the GDR rested on a particular 
claim to history already having come to pass; and that history was inextricable from the history 
of a Germany that had very lately experienced the paroxysm of not only the unspeakable crimes 
of the Third Reich, but the early post-war abuses of Soviet occupation. With these traumas 
marking the genesis of the GDR, a measure of historical amnesia can be understood, if not 
ultimately excused. A fiction vital to the GDR was its long, unbroken claim to a legacy of 
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German communism; and not merely a claim to communism, but one pristine in the face of Nazi 
atrocities. As it turned out, it was former East Germans, the proud heirs of the antifas, who were 
responsible some of the ugliest fascistoid behavior of the early reunification period. This irony 
will stand as one of the last among many in the history of the German Democratic Republic. 
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